


DUTCH NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND DEFENSE
RESTRUCTURING SINCE THE COLD WAR

Richard B. Liebl



Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree
Master of Arts
In the Department of West European Studies
Indiana University

May 1997

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RESTRUCTURING SINCE THE COLD WAR

Richard B. Liebl


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
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To: The Officers and Men of the Royal Dutch Army

"Belangrijk werk, de tijd van je leven..."

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RBL
Bloomington, Indiana
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INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, I will present a discussion on the restructuring of the Dutch armed forces since the end of the Cold War and its impact on Dutch security policy. What follows are this author's perceptions of developments in Dutch National Security policy and defense restructuring. This discussion is important for two reasons. First the Netherlands is an important member of NATO and plays a significant role in the alliance. Restructuring of the Dutch armed forces has implications for NATO in terms of the Netherlands' ability to meet new NATO mission requirements. Secondly, restructuring of the Dutch armed forces provides a new "instrument of diplomacy" for the Dutch government, providing Dutch political decision makers with new military options that were never before feasible. Understanding how the Dutch armed forces is being restructured provides a better understanding of their capabilities and contributions they bring to future coalition military operations.

In a profoundly altered world, faced with new security challenges, there is no escaping changes to those organizations responsible for the security of Europe. In June 1991, the allies began to redefine NATO's future core tasks. In 1996, allied governments continued even further, accepting the principle that NATO forces may undertake military operations outside the NATO treaty-area. As a result, NATO members have been confronted with the inevitable task of reassessing and redeveloping their armed forces in order to function within this new security framework. In addition to changes in the post-

Cold War NATO mission, European Union countries, as signatories to the Maastricht treaty, are committed to creating "a common foreign and security policy," laying the basis for an eventual common European defense. To respond to the changed circumstances in Europe, the evolution of NATO and the development of a European defense identity, the Netherlands is redirecting and restructuring the Dutch armed forces to meet the challenges of the new security environment. The changes are profound. Since the end of the Cold War, the Netherlands has fundamentally changed its defense policy. In this thesis I will argue that the Netherlands foreign and security policy have changed from one of cautious commitment to the defense of Europe to one of active involvement in *preserving world peace*. The restructuring of the Dutch armed forces and its new capabilities are the evidence to support this proposition.

In this work, I will use a variety of sources. Most of the material comes directly from the Dutch Ministry of Defense, including sources obtained while attending the Netherlands Defense College. Additionally, I will use sources from the Dutch Parliament (including memorandums and reports,) the *Clingendael* Institute for International Relations in The Hague, Dutch newspapers and periodicals, personal interviews, articles from NATO and the Atlantic Council, and Indiana University resources.

In chapter one, I will give a brief overview of the evolution of Dutch Foreign policy and security traditions from 1900 until the end of the Cold War. I will also examine the current security situation and provide an overview of crisis and conflicts (both actual and potential) that have security implications for the Netherlands.

In chapter two, I will discuss the new Dutch security perspective in the context of NATO, the UN and WEU. This will be followed by outlining the procedure currently used by senior Dutch defense planners for conducting "strategic analysis." This procedure is used in determining "vital" Dutch national interests and will include the criteria utilized by Dutch political leaders in determining their involvement in future conflicts.

In chapter three, I will describe the reorganization of the Dutch armed forces, focusing on the new missions, and the impact of the defense budget on the new organization and weapons systems. I will illustrate that the changes in the armed forces are more significant than simply a "force modernization" program.

In chapter four, I will discuss the impact of the end of conscription, the "All Volunteer" force, and the impact of the new security policy on Dutch society. I will discuss the implications of transitioning from a conscript force to an all volunteer force and discuss the issue of public support for the new role the Dutch armed forces.

In essence, the following factors have contributed to the Netherlands' defense restructuring; the end of the Cold War, the diminished threat of an all-out attack against Western Europe and instability produced by ethnic conflicts and resurging nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. This new security threat has produced a plethora of threats that Defense planners must address.

Finally, in conclusion, I will provide an assessment of the Dutch armed forces in terms of the quality of their contributions in future coalition operations.

CHAPTER 1

"Aggression grows in unsettled or disorderly times, and explodes in a power vacuum."

-Bevin Alexander, *The Future of Warfare*

I. Introduction:

The past several years have been characterized by a rapid succession of major political changes. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union heralded the end of the Cold War and ushered in a new period of uncertainty in the security of Europe. The threat of an all-out military offensive from the East is no longer a reality, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union into a number of independent republics at the end of 1991 caused new shifts in European defense relations. Indeed, the abrupt collapse of the Soviet bloc, while contributing to a changed perception of threats facing Europe, has created a new strategic environment which is at once dynamic, uncertain, and unstable. Since the end of the Cold War, European military strategists have been grappling with a security situation that continues to defy clear definition.

In terms of territory, the Netherlands ranks 117th in the world, in terms of population it ranks 40th, in terms of GNP 14th, but in terms of membership in international organizations, it ranks second in the world.¹ It is through their active involvement in international organizations

¹Rudy B. Andeweg, The Dutch Government and Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993), 214.

that the Dutch attempt to rise above the status of a small country. The Second Gulf War illustrated that being a member of an international organization and counting as a member are two very different aspects. Being counted requires active participation in actions that require the use of political and military power. The Dutch were quick to recognize this lesson.

The purpose of this chapter is first, to examine the evolution of Dutch foreign policy and security traditions that have shaped Dutch international and security relations and discuss their influence in emerging Dutch security policy and military affairs; second, to examine in a broad context the European security situation today, identifying areas of current or potential crisis and conflict; finally, to look at the specific security concerns for the Netherlands, and illustrate how these concerns have influenced Dutch defense restructuring.

II. The Evolution of Dutch Foreign Policy and Security Traditions:

General:

Throughout much of its history, Dutch foreign and security policy has shown a remarkable degree of continuity. Dutch foreign policy and security traditions have been historically influenced by, and categorized in, three factors or "constants." These constants were best described by the current Dutch Minister of Defense, Joris Voorhoeve, in his work, *Peace, Profits and Principles*. In his book, Voorhoeve identifies and analyses Dutch foreign and security policy based on three major "traditions." He identifies these traditions as "*maritime commercialism, neutralist abstentionism, and internationalist idealism*."² Some scholars prefer to speak of tendencies or themes when discussing Dutch foreign and security policy, while

²J. J. C. Voorhoeve, Peace, Profits and Principles (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1979), 42.

others have expanded Voorhoeve's list. However the themes mentioned by other scholars remain closely related to the clusters of attitudes mentioned by Voorhoeve and thus will serve as the foundation for this discussion of evolving Dutch foreign policy and security traditions.

Maritime Commercialism:

Both the size and the geographic location of the Netherlands have left a permanent imprint on the country's external relations. The Dutch are a seafaring people. Because of its location at the mouth of several significant waterways extending into the interior of the continent, the Netherlands is ideally located to serve as a gateway to the European hinterland. As a result, the Netherlands has historically looked more to the Atlantic as a source of both livelihood and security than to continental powers. This has traditionally brought an "Atlantic perspective" to its foreign policy that at times could even be characterized as "anti-continental." This was recognized even by the seventeenth century, when Pieter de la Court, a prominent Dutch merchant and political scientist, advocated creating a wide swath of water to the east of the province of Holland, to separate it from the continent.³ Even in the 1950's, the Dutch Foreign Office proclaimed: "the Netherlands cannot exist without Europe, but it is a continental European power neither in its history nor its character."⁴

Neutralists Abstentionism:

The significance of trade for the Netherlands cannot be overstated. Trade is the life line of the Netherlands. Accordingly, Dutch foreign and security policy has reflected a tendency to

³Rudy B. Andeweg, The Dutch Government and Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993), 212.

⁴Ibid. , 213.

maintain the status quo and support conditions which would allow continued economic prosperity in the international arena. This tradition is referred to by Voorhoeve as "neutralist abstentionism." Historically, the continued prosperity of the Netherlands was directly related to its absence from entangling alliances and the intrigues of European power politics. Any disturbance in the balance of power could adversely affect Dutch trade and thus was avoided at all costs.

Although tenuous at times, neutralist policy adequately met the security needs of the Netherlands through the Nineteenth Century and early Twentieth Century, even sparing them the horrors of the First World War. However, by the outbreak of the Second World War, the policy had become dangerously obsolete. Neglecting its security matters in favor of this neutralist policy proved to be costly, and the Dutch capitulated to the Germans after only four days of fighting. After the war, the Dutch vowed never again to suffer as they had under the German occupation of 1940-1945. Dutch political leaders recognized the need to join in a collective security arrangement and accordingly, became members of NATO.

Although the Netherlands abandoned neutrality as a security policy, some observers note that joining NATO in reality represented less of a break in traditional neutralists policy than one would expect.⁵ Under the NATO umbrella, the Netherlands was exempt from the need of pursuing its own foreign and security policy agenda. This allowed the Netherlands to exercise a policy of "*afzijdigheid in afhankelijkheid*" (aloofness in dependence.) Participation in NATO allowed the Dutch to continue a policy that negated the need to advance a more comprehensive

⁵Ibid.

foreign and security policy.

Internationalist Idealism:

The final "constant" in Dutch foreign and security policy is what Voorhoeve referred to as "Internationalist Idealism." The idea is that the Netherlands should inject its perception of morality and justice in the world. This "constant" however reflects more the Dutch interest in maintaining the status quo and remaining aloof from power politics, than the lofty aspirations of world justice and moral responsibility. Not that Dutch idealism is not an important factor in the conduct of their foreign and security policy, rather when confronted between being pragmatic and being moralistic, the Dutch have invariably opted for pragmatism. Even since the time of Hugo Grotius, the content of international law (the Dutch being the leading proponent of its codification) has rarely failed to serve Dutch interests in free trade and open sea passages.⁶

In sum, these constants have guided Dutch foreign and security policy since its conception as a nation and remain relevant factors in its foreign and security policy to this day. However, with the end of the Cold War, the need for the development of an independent and more ambitious foreign and security policy has arisen based on the changed European security climate. The crumbling of Cold War Europe, new threats to stability, greater European integration, combined with changes in American involvement in Europe have prompted the Dutch to reexamine its security policy.

Evolving Dutch military affairs:

In conjunction with the development of a new foreign and security policy, the Dutch

⁶Ibid. , 214.

government has redirected the Defense establishment correspondingly. The Netherlands is currently undergoing the most profound restructuring of its armed forces this century. However, changes in Dutch military affairs are not in itself a new phenomenon. Several evolutions in Dutch military affairs have occurred just within this century. Evolutions in Dutch military affairs have corresponded to the existing foreign and security policies of the time, the Dutch military reinventing itself based on the security perceptions of the Dutch government.

Neutrality, and Aloofness: 1900-1940

From the beginning of the twentieth century until the outbreak of the Second World War, the Dutch relied on a combination of military factors to ensure security of Dutch sovereignty. The Dutch relied heavily upon positive foreign relations with Britain and on the Dutch Navy in helping to secure Dutch commercial interest abroad. The Dutch army was largely neglected throughout this period and consequently was poorly trained and equipped. During this period, the Dutch believed that strict observance of neutral obligations, the mass mobilization of its army and the use of natural barriers (inundation of the polders) would prove adequate. The humiliating defeat at the hands of the Wehrmacht in 1940 proved how feeble Dutch defenses had become. It was to be a painful lesson.

Calculated Commitment: The Cold War 1945-1989

After the policy of neutrality and aloofness proved itself disastrous during World War Two, the Dutch forever abandoned it and became full-fledged members of the NATO alliance. During the Cold War, Dutch military affairs' policy focused on the execution of its NATO mission and on strategic deterrence under NATO's nuclear umbrella. The Netherlands limited its overseas involvement to small-scale combat operations under UN auspices in the Korean

Conflict and participation in a number of traditional UN operations, namely peacekeeping and deployment of UN observer personnel. The one exception was the Dutch colonial conflict in Indonesia (1947-1949), which ended with the independence of the former Dutch colony in 1949.

The New World Order: 1990-present:

The collapse of communism in 1989 resulted in a new emerging Dutch military strategy. The Dutch recognized the need to reexamine its foreign and security policy and revamp its military accordingly. Fundamentally at issue is the question of vital interest and those contingencies in which Dutch forces may have to be employed in the future. Several basic elements underpin the new Dutch evolution in military affairs. It is based on continued support for NATO and US involvement in Europe. Additionally, it is based on further European integration and expansion and the development of a European Defense identity as well as maintaining its traditional support for UN missions. However because of the emergence of a number of "unconventional" threats, the national security of the Netherlands has become more broadly defined and its political, economic and technological components are of increasing importance. The added dimension to the new evolution in Dutch military affairs is the restructuring of its armed forces into *a small, professional, highly trained, well-equipped force available to act world wide in support of Dutch national interests*. For the first time in modern history, the Netherlands will have a viable "military option" that can realistically participate, and sustain on a limited scale, military operations in support of its national objectives.

III. The European Security Environment Today:

General:

When Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait in August 1990, The United States began

building a coalition of nations that defeated Iraq in less than 100 hours of ground combat. In the initial stages of the buildup, no one would ever have predicted that the war would conclude so decisively. Indeed Iraq had the fourth largest army in the world, was combat hardened by eight years of war with Iran, possessed relatively sophisticated Soviet-made weapons including SCUD-B missiles. Even more frightening, Iraq was known to possess chemical weapons and had utilized them in the conflict against Iran and against the Kurdish minorities in northern Iraq. In light of these circumstances the Dutch government, being typically pragmatic and realistic, saw that this was a conflict that would be costly, not only economically but certainly in terms of human lives. Even though Western Europe was heavily dependent upon oil coming from the Persian Gulf, the Dutch chose not to support the coalition with any substantial commitment of ground forces. Although a vocal supporter for United States action in the Gulf, the Dutch chose instead to assist in more indirect ways, helping in the embarkation of American forces from the port of Rotterdam and by contributing a small naval contingent enforcing the UN-declared naval blockade. I maintain that the decision not to contribute ground forces was to haunt the Dutch. In the euphoria that swept through the coalition nations upon completion of the ground war, the Dutch found themselves standing alone on the sidelines. While Britain, France and the United States celebrated their victory, the Dutch realized that they had missed a foreign policy opportunity. The Dutch came to the realization that future conflicts would be settled not unilaterally by the United States, but in coalitions of nations. The Second Gulf War demonstrated to the Dutch the need to reorganize and reequip its armed forces so as not to miss future opportunities to "show the flag" in coalition actions such as "Desert Storm." In light of the Dutch participation in UN actions in the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Haiti and Africa, the

Dutch have entered a new era of security and foreign policy.

Uncertainty about future conflicts and threats have forced European defense policy makers to do a critical analysis and reevaluate the roles and missions entailed in their defense policies. It remains a complicated and elusive problem. Although from a military perspective, attacks by the former Soviet Union cannot be ruled out, a strategic surprise attack is considered by most experts as no longer a military possibility. Indeed, recent military operations by Russian forces have illuminated the striking ineptitude and decline in Russian military capability.

Accordingly, these developments have contributed to a fundamental redefinition of the international security situation. In the past, the security situation in Europe was described in terms of its military dimension, expressed in terms of the risk of large-scale aggression. Today, it is increasingly defined in political, social, economic, ecological and humanitarian terms. It is now more apparent that a close link exists between the maintenance of peace and improvements in the economic and social conditions in countries experiencing conflicts. Future security concerns will involve more than simply separating the contending parties and monitoring peace settlements. Providing humanitarian aid, helping to repair infrastructure and other basic facilities of these war-ravaged areas, and assisting in the return of displaced populations put to flight by regional and ethnic conflicts are the types of new challenges faced by European Defense planners. Additionally, adequate arsenals of military means for both peacekeeping and peace enforcement will be necessary in order to ensure stability, to maintain the international rule of law and to preserve the security of the alliance. It is important to have both the military capabilities to facilitate peace, as in peacekeeping operations, and the ability to install peace

forcefully, to separate and isolate warring factions, as in a peace enforcement operation.⁷ It is a difficult order to fill for defense planners accustomed to having only a single threat to contend with.

As a result, Dutch security policy has shifted towards containing not only the conflicts that may occur within the NATO treaty area, but also conflicts on the periphery of Europe. Dutch security policy has changed its focus from helping to defeat the Warsaw Pact, to conducting successful crisis management operations. Although the risk of a major European conflict can of course never be ruled out, the likelihood is extremely small and such a conflict would be of a different scale and nature than what had previously been anticipated.

IV. The Threat Perception of the Netherlands:

General:

What are some of the unique security threats/concerns to the Netherlands and what is the new focus of Dutch Defense policy? In view of the uncertainty of international security developments, the emphasis of Dutch security policy has shifted towards policies that are more proactive. Today, the security of the Netherlands entails more than simply military threats. Dutch national security concerns encompass political, economic, and social dimensions.

NATO Commitment:

First and foremost, Dutch security policy remains firmly committed to the NATO alliance. Dutch Armed Forces must be capable of operations in a NATO context in the event of a large-scale armed conflict anywhere in Europe. This is a considerably larger area of operation

⁷Defense Priorities Review (The Netherlands, Abridged version, Paper presented as a review of the Defense White Paper, Spring 1991), 3.

than the North German Plain, where under the "Cold War" operational plans, the Dutch forces were to be committed. Dutch forces must be capable of conducting operations anywhere in Europe where the security of Europe is in question. Operations in the former Yugoslavia illustrate this commitment to conducting crisis management operations outside the realm of the NATO treaty area. The Netherlands has contributed air, ground and naval contingents in an effort to bring peace and stability to that troubled region.

Territorial Commitments:

Dutch defense policy makers must also focus their attention not only on Europe. The Caribbean territories remain the last vestiges of the Dutch Colonial Empire. The Dutch Antilles consist of a number of islands located in the southern area of the lesser Antilles. Currently there is little direct military threat to the Dutch Antilles and Aruba. Several of these islands, namely Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao lie within proximity to Venezuela, and the Venezuelans have renounced any claim to the islands. In 1975, a treaty was signed between the two countries recognizing the Netherlands Antilles as a Dutch protectorate. However, the discovery of oil in the region has renewed Venezuelan economic and political interests in and around the islands.⁸

Refugees:

The world is currently confronted with a number of intrastate conflicts. Civil wars throughout the world have extensive consequences in a wider international spectrum. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Romania, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka have contributed to the massive movements of refugees and asylum seekers to Western Europe. In 1994, 40 million

⁸Ibid. , 6.

people were classified as refugees. Because the Netherlands has a reputation of tolerance and favorable asylum policies, it is often the desired country of immigration. In an already overcrowded country, the increased flow of refugees, combined with other immigrants, threatens social stability and places an additional political and economical burden on the government. Racial violence in the Netherlands has increased dramatically over the last several years. The increased pressure of more refugees and other minorities is likely to exacerbate racial tensions in the Netherlands.

International Drug Trade and Organized Crime:

Because of its ideal location as the gateway to Europe and the Dutch reputation for tolerance of so-called "soft drugs," the Netherlands is faced with growing security concerns directly related to drug trafficking and organized crime. The Netherlands has a thriving "drug tourism" bringing thousands of foreigners and drug dealers into the Netherlands every year. The redistribution of illegal narcotics by "drug tourists" and narcotics traffickers back into their country of origin has created considerable tension between France, Germany and the Netherlands. French-Dutch relations in particular have been exacerbated over this issue, with the Netherlands refusing to bow to pressure to tighten its counter-narcotics policies. As a result of increased international pressure to stem the flow of illegal drugs into Europe, the armed forces of the Netherlands may be required to increase its role in counter-narcotic efforts. Such an example recently occurred when Dutch naval assets were utilized for surveillance and interdiction on the open seas, of a large shipment of illegal narcotics destined for the Netherlands.

Dutch interests in the Caribbean are also complicated by the international drug trade

and by organized crime. The islands serve not only as intermediate staging areas for the smuggling of narcotics, but the small island nations serve as a mechanism to launder the profits of the drug cartels. The powerful Latin American cartels have a vested interest in maintaining transition points within the Caribbean and they possess the power to topple the relatively weak island nations that hinder their operations. The Dutch government in close cooperation with the Dutch Antilles and other international organizations is committed to disrupting the flow of illegal narcotics transitioning through the islands.⁹

This nonmilitary threat to Dutch security involving cross-border criminal activities, drug smuggling, "white slavery," illegal immigration and illegal arms trading is certainly not a new phenomenon to the Netherlands, however what is new is the political dimension these activities have taken. Organized crime has attempted to corrupt officials, and undermine the legitimate institutions in the Netherlands. Criminal organizations such as the Russian Mafia as well as foreign intelligence services view the Netherlands as a particularly lucrative target country. The Netherlands is a technologically advanced country and it is perhaps one of the least policed in all of Europe. It is a prime target for industrial espionage. Acquiring "dual usage" technologies that have civilian use but also serve as components for weapons of mass destruction is the goal of these organizations.¹⁰ Additionally, these organizations are attempting to access Dutch Justice and Defense computer networks. Tapping into these networks affords international crime syndicates access to sensitive information of use throughout the European Union. This

⁹Ibid. , 76.

¹⁰Ibid. , 82.

information would allow them to predict any interdiction attempts by Dutch authorities, giving them the ability to anticipate police and military operations aimed at controlling drug smuggling and other illegal operations.¹¹

Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Over the last few years the concern over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has greatly increased. The threat of mutually assured destruction by two superpowers is no longer realistic. However, the threat of nuclear terrorism remains a very important security concern. The Netherlands is a major transition point for world trade and serves as a natural point of departure for the proliferation of nuclear materials, related technologies, and conventional weapons. The Netherlands has participated in negotiations for new multilateral export control systems for conventional weapons and weapons technologies. This should lead to increased cooperation and responsibility regarding the export of conventional weapons.¹² The armed forces of the Netherlands must be prepared to deter the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies possibly transitioning through the Netherlands and pursue measures to control the export of conventional weapons.

International Terrorism:

International terrorism remains another viable threat to the security of the Netherlands. Although attacks on military and other objectives remain relatively low, terrorist groups opposed to the Dutch political position may resort to terrorist attack to persuade the Dutch government to

¹¹Ibid. , 83.

¹²Ibid.

reverse its position on certain political issues. A recent example of this occurred in 1995, when terrorist threats were made by PKK Kurdish separatists protesting continued Dutch diplomatic relations with Turkey. A terrorist organization could also threaten to attack the Netherlands based on its participation as part of an international peacekeeping effort.¹³ The Netherlands' intricate system of commercial transportation networks originating in the harbor of Rotterdam is a particularly vulnerable target to international terrorist attack not only from an economic standpoint but also as a vital military Line of Communication (LOC) for the deployment of United States forces to Europe.

In sum, the threats to Dutch security are diverse and very real. In addition to those areas of crisis and conflict that threaten the overall security and stability of Europe, the Dutch armed forces must adapt to meet a broad range of possible missions, including humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, combating international terrorism and organized crime and eliminating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

V. Conclusion:

In this chapter I have described how current Dutch security policy has evolved from the centuries old "constants" in foreign and security policy and I have briefly discussed evolutions in Dutch military affairs from 1900 to the present, illustrating how the current manifestation of Dutch security policy is unique in its history. I have delineated the current security situation in Europe, and I have addressed specific threats that confront the Netherlands. It is this new security situation in Europe that has served as the catalyst for the sweeping developments in

¹³Ibid.

Dutch National Security policy and the restructuring of its armed forces.

The center of balance in Dutch foreign and security policy has shifted. Although NATO remains the keystone in those policies, the Netherlands has focused on engagement rather than complacency. The new Dutch foreign and security policy is directed toward active participation in the preservation of peace rather than reliance on military deterrence.

In the following chapter, I will examine the new Dutch security perspective within the context of key international security organizations. To further illustrate the depth with which Dutch security policy has evolved, I will delineate a "model" used by Dutch defense planners in conducting "strategic analysis." This model is used in the formation of strategic-level decision making, illuminating the new emphasis on global security concerns.

CHAPTER 2

"Any change is for the worse, even change for the better."

-Jacques Bloem, Dutch Poet

I. Introduction:

With the end of the Cold War, and the melting of glacial tension between the superpowers, the pace of international security developments has accelerated greatly. This fluid environment imposes new challenges to the foreign and security policy of the Netherlands. In the previous chapter, I examined the broad spectrum of this new security situation and related it to the security concerns of the Netherlands. In this chapter, I will carry the analysis a step further by discussing the position of the Dutch government in terms of international security cooperation. The fluidity of the security situation has required the Dutch government to reevaluate their position within the context of security cooperation and to devise a "system of strategic analysis" for developing comprehensive policies needed in confronting the new security challenges of the coming century.

The purpose of this chapter is three fold. First, I will outline Dutch policy on security cooperation within the United Nations, the Transatlantic Alliance and in European Security Cooperation. Secondly, I will address in detail a methodology currently used by Dutch Defense planners in conducting "Strategic Analysis." I will delineate the six step model used to determine "vital national interest," the desired "end state" and what "instruments of power" can be applied in the development of Dutch

security policy. Lastly, I will briefly outline the criteria used by Dutch political decision makers in determining if and when the Dutch armed forces should be deployed in a conflict outside the NATO Treaty area.

II. Security and Stability: The Dutch Outlook on International Security

In spite of the cherished hope that the horrors of war would forever be banned from the continent of Europe, once again the scenes of armed conflict present themselves. Destruction and chaos brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the rise of ethnic nationalism has compelled the political leadership of the Netherlands to help expand Europe's capacity to safeguard peace and stability. For the Netherlands, the Transatlantic alliance, coupled with the continued process of European integration, form the basis for evolving Dutch security policy. Dutch security rests in the preservation of the internal cohesion of both structures.

Because of the complexities of emerging Dutch foreign and security policy, it is a fundamental belief of the Dutch government that only through international cooperation can these conflicts be resolved. This premise is the underlying foundation for Dutch security cooperation with international organizations. Accordingly, the Dutch government has pursued an active international policy of supporting international organizations, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the West European Union (WEU), the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations (UN). The Dutch government sees itself as a contributor (perhaps with only limited means) to "coalitions of the willing" in the pursuit of stability.

Given the enormous challenges facing Europe and the fact that many problems affecting Dutch security are directly related to the situation in the former Soviet Union, it is paramount for Dutch security policy that the United States remains an active leader in maintaining security on the continent. For the Dutch, NATO remains the perfect context in which to assure continued American involvement in Europe. The removal of the once considerable threat to NATO has required a reevaluation of the future role of NATO. The Dutch have been more than enthusiastic in supporting innovative initiatives, including NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs and in the formation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. Dutch armed forces have participated in a number of exchange exercises with former Warsaw Pact States, signing Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) acknowledging a new era of cooperation between former enemies. Additionally, the Netherlands Defense College operates a Foreign Officer Orientation Course (FOOC) for Eastern European countries.¹

Institutional changes in NATO alone are insufficient in themselves. New roles and missions for NATO must include a desire to take on greater responsibility for security, expressed in practical terms, through greater European security cooperation. To utilize terms more commonly associated with European Integration, as NATO "widens" (with eventual expansion East) and "deepens" (expanding types of missions performed), so has Dutch security policy.

¹This course brings officers from the Visegrad and other Eastern European countries to the Netherlands to provide exposure to NATO operations and doctrine. Additionally, it helps in cultural bonding and establishes professional working relationships. The program has evolved from a "shopping trip" for senior officers into an important building block for PfP.

Countries in the East have made it consistently clear that they do not want to fall into a nebulous security zone and wish to become full-fledged members of NATO. The Dutch government favors a coordinated strategy for the expansion of NATO and the European Union. In the Dutch government's point of view, expansion must move slowly, and must occur in such a way as to contribute to the stability of the continent as a whole. Recent parliamentary debates over expansion of NATO were supported almost overwhelmingly. (However some opposition, namely from the leader of the VVD or Party for Peoples Freedom and Democracy, Frits Bolkestein has generated further discussions.)² At the same time, the structures of cooperation and consultation established between NATO and Russia must be developed further. In this regard, the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which is to be strengthened in consultation with Russia, is viewed as the organization that insures that this occurs.

In spite of their desire to see America engaged in Europe, the Dutch government has assumed that the United States will not always be willing to contribute in the security concerns of Europe, particularly where it has no direct obligation to do so under *Article V* of the Washington Treaty. The Dutch government believes that it is important to further develop the West European Union and the concept of the CJTF, enabling Europe to carry out security operations on its own, albeit with NATO logistical support. In the Netherlands' view, one way of moving toward a more pronounced European role in its

²InterNetKrant, 9 Feb. 1997, 1.

own security would be to incorporate the WEU into the European Union.³

While classic conflicts between countries are becoming more infrequent, the new world order has experienced a sharp increase in small-scale, violent internal conflicts. These crisis situations demand the employment of a broad range of international instruments in achieving their resolution. This may include such widely varying activities as offering humanitarian assistance, mediating between warring factions and the employment of military forces in a peacekeeping role. From the Dutch government's perspective, the United Nations continues to serve as the cardinal international organization in which to achieve these goals. The number of United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the Dutch contributions to these operations, has increased drastically since the end of the Cold War. The tools available to the United Nations in order to resolve these crisis and conflicts have also become more specialized. In some cases, an embargo may be imposed and its observance monitored. At a later stage, it may be necessary to monitor compliance with agreed-to peace accords, to send observers to supervise elections, or to send resources to assist with economic rehabilitation and the setting up of democratic state structures to keep peace internally.⁴ These measures require coordination at the international as well as national level, and therefore the Dutch see their contributions to world security best achieved under the auspices of the United

³Foreign Policy of the Netherlands: A Review (The Hague, September 1995), 28.

⁴*Ibid.*, 29.

Nations.⁵ A number of recent UN peace operations in which the Dutch have played a role have been reasonably successful. Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Northern Iraq and Haiti are all examples in which the Dutch contributed to the overall success. UN operations in the former Yugoslavia however proved to be less conclusive and taught the Dutch several painful lessons.

On June 28, 1995, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van Mierlo and the Minister of Defense Joris Voorhoeve established a basic set of principles concerning the deployment of Dutch military units for peace operations. The goal was to determine how peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations should be set up, how ambitious should their aims be and what contributions should be fulfilled before these operations should be undertaken.⁶ Experiences in Bosnia have certainly influenced the outcome of these deliberations. One thing is certain, the question of disengagement is no longer an option for Dutch decision makers. The Dutch believe and rightly so, that armed conflicts should not be left to smolder and ignite into larger conflagrations. Doing nothing has its price and that price can be very high.

The future role of the Dutch in security matters of Europe and the world will be one of cautious involvement. The Dutch government expects that the international

⁵In 1995, the Dutch Defense Minister, supported by Premier Kok, offered a Brigade-sized Dutch combat force as a permanent UN peacekeeping force, if other UN members would match the Dutch contribution. Most member states declined to participate.

⁶There remains some ambiguity to the terms *Peacekeeping* and *Peace enforcement* operations. *Peacekeeping* can be defined in general terms as operations designed to maintain stability as a result of an already established peace accord. *Peace enforcement* operations involve the direct use of combat units to physically separate belligerents, by force if necessary.

community will request the Netherlands to contribute to a wide variety of peace operations. This will involve the deployment of Dutch military forces, a relatively new prospect in Dutch Foreign and security policy. Accordingly, the Dutch expect that by providing troops for an operation, they will also take part in the relevant international consultations. This is an important aspect for a small nation such as the Netherlands. Its willingness to participate in such operations enhances the importance and national prestige of the Netherlands, a key factor in a "small nation" that does not wish to be regarded as a "small people." The Dutch recognize that involvement must be carefully considered and that short-term intervention results in minimal success. The phase of political and economic reconstruction referred to as "peace building" is essential to success and can demand long-term involvement and the sacrifice of valuable national resources. This careful consideration, and acknowledgment of the need for long-term commitment and its impact on Dutch involvement, reflect new levels of strategic thought that never before played a role in modern Dutch security policy.

The following tenets have been formulated as a guide for Dutch contributions within the context of security cooperation. These tenets form the basic principles for current Dutch security policy, and provide the basis around which the Dutch armed forces have been restructured. These tenets are as follows:

- In view of the diversity of risks and threats the Netherlands must in principle be prepared and able to contribute to a broad spectrum of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.
- The Netherlands will invariably make its armed forces available in an international

context.

- In the event of a direct threat to the territory of the Netherlands, or to the NATO treaty area, their defense will receive the highest priority.
- All combat-ready Dutch units can in principle be made available to international peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.⁷

The Dutch recognize that new security concerns require new developments and new responsibilities. The “peace dividend” expected as a result of the end of the Cold War had, oddly enough, propelled the importance of the armed forces to the Dutch decision makers. The armed forces have much more relevance in post-Cold War security policy and the Dutch government has made a concerted effort to develop the right balance of military power to provide decision makers with a viable military option. Based on the above-mentioned tenets, the main tasks for the Dutch armed forces can be summarized as follows:

- To carry out crisis management operations as part of Dutch security policy.
- To protect the integrity of national and allied territory and to protect national territory against threats resulting from participation in crisis management operations.⁸

Implementing these above-mentioned principles leads to a force structure that is capable of maintaining a capacity for simultaneous participation in a maximum of four

⁷Defense Priorities Review , 5.

⁸Ibid.

peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations or the CSCE.⁹

The Dutch have played and will continue to play an active role in security operation conducted under the aegis of NATO, WEU, the UN, or the CSCE. Of these security organizations, NATO and especially American involvement in NATO remains the cornerstone of Dutch security policy. The WEU, in close coordination with NATO, is viewed by the Dutch as the vehicle for developing and expanding a European security identity. The Dutch state very clearly that the WEU is not a substitute for NATO, nor a rival security organization, but rather it is to be used as a complementary organization that offers increased flexibility in responding to security matters, especially those that for various political reasons would be better served through an exclusively European response.

On July 8, 1995, Soldier First Class Raviv van Renssen of the Royal Dutch Army was killed by hand grenade shrapnel while conducting peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When his flag-draped coffin was lowered off the C-130 ramp at Soesterberg Air Base, the mourners gathered there, reflected the emotions of the entire nation. Why had this soldier died in the far away former Yugoslavia? Was it in the "national interest" of the Netherlands to put its sons and daughters into harm's way? How many more young Dutchmen would be carried down the ramp at Soesterberg? For the Dutch people, the implications of Dutch security policy now were a sobering reality. Although other Dutch soldiers had been casualties in the former Yugoslavia, it was the

⁹Theo van den Doel, "A Review of Dutch Defense Policy: Challenges and Risks," Restructuring Armed Forces in East and West (San Francisco: Westview Press, Inc. 1994), 65.

death of van Renssen that made it clear to both the Dutch people and political leaders alike that involvement in world conflicts would come with a high price. Faced with new threats and now a viable military instrument, the difficult task faced by Dutch decision makers is the what, when, where, and why involved in the decision to use this new military instrument. In characteristic fashion, the Dutch have explored the issue in detail and gone to great lengths to develop a methodology to that decision making process.

III. Strategic Analysis:

General:

According to LTG H. A. Couzy, the summer of 1995 will forever be marked as a dark episode in the history of the Dutch Army.¹⁰ This tragedy was to overshadow the efforts of the peacekeeping effort being conducted by the Dutch army as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.

In 1994, in an effort to bring some degree of stability to the war-torn province of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Nations announced the establishment of "*Safe havens*" around several key population centers. The idea was to create demilitarized zones protected by UN peacekeeping forces. "*Safe havens*" were established in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica. If the UN could not stop the Bosnian Serbs campaign of "*ethnic cleansing*," then perhaps the creation of the "*safe areas*" would at least provide some limited measure of security to the Muslim population. The Netherlands had contributed troops to UNPROFOR from the very beginning. This was

¹⁰H. A. Couzy, Mijn jaren als bevelhebber [My Years as Commander] (Amsterdam, Uitgeverij L. J. Veen, 1996), 148.

the third rotation of DUTCHBAT, short for "Dutch Battalion," and it had responsibility for the "*safe haven*" in Srebrenica.

In January 1995, the third battalion of 11th Airmobile Brigade under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Ton Karremans assumed operational control for Srebrenica.¹¹ Over the next several weeks, the Bosnian Serb troops under General Mladic had occupied the high ground surrounding Srebrenica with tanks and heavy artillery. The Bosnian Serbs became increasingly aggressive, cutting off food and fuel convoys to the "*safe haven*" and holding Dutch patrols hostage. DUTCHBAT 3 was powerless. Equipped with only light weapons they were no-match for the guns of Mladic. In July 1995, the Bosnian Serbs launched an all-out attack on Muslim defenses in Srebrenica. Karremans and his Dutch peacekeepers were given an ultimatum, stand down or be overrun. Karremans' request for air support was not responded to and offered no real hope for resistance. When General Mladic demanded that he stand aside, Karremans had little choice but to step down. The failure of Karremans' battalion would have disastrous consequences.

After the UN mission in Bosnia was replaced by the more tenacious NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), investigators discovered the mass graves of hundreds of thousands of Muslims slaughtered by the Bosnian Serbs after the fall of Srebrenica in that fateful July. Srebrenica had been Dutch responsibility. The Dutch press and the nation itself were outraged. The Army's and the nation's prestige were severely

¹¹Ibid. , 149.

damaged by this event. The official investigation concluded that Karremans had acted in the only feasible manner, however, an independent investigation by the Institute for War Crimes Documentation in The Hague is continuing the investigation.¹² How had the leadership failed to prevent this disaster?

One of the results of the debacle in Srebrenica was an increased emphasis for defense planners on "strategic analysis." Srebrenica was to be an important lesson for the Dutch on the risks of involvement, a lesson that was taken to heart by the Ministry of Defense (MOD). In a situation in which the Netherlands is faced with a security crisis or is compelled for political reasons to participate in some future international conflict, the following informal model of "strategic analysis" has been developed and is currently being taught as required instruction for Dutch Army Officers as part of the Strategy Department of the Netherlands Defense College. The other branches of the Dutch armed forces receive similar instruction in their respective courses. The very fact that a Strategy Department exists and strategic analysis is being taught to the future senior defense personnel reflects the new global perspective of Dutch security policy.

This model can be utilized as a logical step by step approach to answering critical questions arising from a crisis situation.¹³ For the Netherlands the questions are:

- What are the important consequences for Dutch involvement?
- What is the desired end state (what specific goals are to be achieved by the Dutch

¹²CNN World Report, 24 November, 1996, The Hague, the Netherlands.

¹³This model is derived from the "strategic analysis" model taught at the United States Army's Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth.

government?)

-What measures (sources of national power) can be used and should be used to achieve the desired end state.

The process is a 6-step process that is broken down as follows:

Step 1. Situation Sketch: An overview of possible consequences (long and short term) of the conflict.

Step 2. National Inventory: What are the national interests, goals, and instruments of national power available?

Step 3. The Area/Political surroundings: Who are the relevant players in the situation, what are their goals, what is the evaluation of their instruments of power?

Step 4. Strategy Development (ends, ways, and means): Develop and test options (end state coupled with measures) based on a zero-line scenario.

Step 5. Risk Analysis: Analyze the developed options and develop other "alternative" scenarios.

Step 6. Make a Decision: Develop a recommendation for a particular course of action.

A brief discussion of each of these steps follows.

Before Dutch analysts can begin a proper analysis of a crisis or conflict, thorough preparation is needed.¹⁴ This preparation is important for two reasons. First, it is critical that the situation is clearly understood. For the strategic analysts, often a problem is

¹⁴For the purpose of this paper, "strategic analysts" is applicable to both civilian and military planners. A distinction is made here between those who make strategic plans and those who make strategic decisions, a task left ultimately to the Dutch Premier and his Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

presented to them with a “less than complete” understanding by the decision makers. It is the task of the analysts to decipher the problem, develop and recommend a course of action. Thus it is essential that the analysts clearly understand the situation.

Understanding the situation corresponds directly with the collection of relevant and timely information. In fact, the quality of the recommendation stemming from a strategic analysis is strongly influenced by the quality of the information available. The information collected must be of sufficient “width” and “depth” in order to understand the essentials of a crisis or conflict. The collection of information in the preparation phase is not conducted in a vacuum. Rather it is a continuous process of acquiring and updating plans based on new information. Many a strategic disaster has occurred because some new development was ignored in favor of the already agreed-upon course of action.

Step 1. Situation Sketch:

In this first step, the analysts give an overview of the historical and actual developments surrounding the conflict. The analysts formulate in general terms the background surrounding the conflict and list the important parties involved. This includes not only the relevant nations but other groups and parties as well. The analysts must in this step formulate the possible consequences resulting from the conflict in terms of the most important and most likely outcomes of the conflict. At this stage it is important to differentiate between short and long term consequences. The total number of options developed usually will give an indication of the scope of the conflict.

Step 2. National Inventory:

The strategic analysts must formulate what national "interests" are threatened by the conflict. The analysts must identify the "vital national interests" and identify specifically how the conflict impacts on the Netherlands. Clear understanding of what the national interests are is problematic for the Dutch. The United States publishes annually for the public a document called "*The National Strategy of the United States of America*." This document serves as the basis for strategic planning at the next lower levels (i.e., Department of Defense.) In it, the "vital national interests" are clearly spelled out and the goals for American foreign and security policy are there for every American to read. For the Dutch strategic analysts, no such document exists. The Dutch analysts must glean from a variety of documents what the nation considers to be its national interests.¹⁵ This basic inventory is not only important from the perspective of which national interests are involved, but also in determining what the national policy concerning the crisis will be. Thus, a clearly defined objective or "end state" must accompany this inventory of national interests.

Once an inventory of national interests has been taken, an inventory of the *elements of national power* must be taken. Elements of national power are categorized into four areas: *Economic, Political, Military and Informational*. Within these four elements of national power rest the specific instruments available to the analysts in the development of a course of action. Each instrument naturally has its own advantages and

¹⁵Prior to 1990, the Netherlands had no real need for a delineation of its own distinct national interests, Dutch national interest being encapsulated in those of the NATO alliance.

disadvantages and each must be carefully considered and weighted based on its ability to achieve the desired end state. At the end of this step the analyst must, as concrete as possible, formulate what the national objective, the "desired end state" is to be and to develop possible measures for the resolution of the conflict. The use of various instruments of power must be formulated into a clear course of action.

Table 2.1 Instruments of National Power

(this list is not all inclusive and lists instruments theoretically available to the Dutch)

Source: "Strategische Analyse" Instituut Defensie Leergangen, Rijswijk, 31 Oct 1995.

Elements	Examples	Advantage	Disadvantage
Economic	-boycott -embargo -economic support	-not expensive -effective in case the target group is vulnerable	-slow influence on target groups -negative consequences for neighboring lands -noneffective if target group is not vulnerable
Political	-diplomacy -withdrawal of diplomatic mission -UN resolutions	-cheap -few resources needed -can be effective	-not effective against a firmly emplaced regime
Informational	-"Radio Free . . ." -"hearts and minds campaign"	-relatively cheap -objectives can be achieved with minimal risk -long-term effectiveness	-usually only effective long-term
Military	-preventive deployment -peacekeeping -peace enforcement -training/ advisors -arms	-fastest -most effective	-expensive -determined by national will -risky

Step 3. The Area:

In this step, the analysts must identify the relevant players in the conflict (states, allies, economic trading partners, international humanitarian organizations, multinationals, terrorist groups, etc.) Then it is necessary to differentiate between *primary parties*, (parties directly influenced in the conflict), *secondary parties*, (parties that through alliances, or bilateral connections, support or oppose one of the primary

parties.) And finally, *tertiary parties* (parties that for any number of reasons exercise influence over one or more of the primary parties.) Once grouped into these categories, the dominate party must be identified as well.

The analysts must address the significant interests of each of the players in the conflict, inventorying each player's specific vital interests and goals. Further more, in this step, the analysts must identify which elements of national power are capable of being exercised by the various parties and how the instruments of national power might be used in the conflict. Because of the complexity of this step, "subject matter experts" must be employed to assist the analysts. At the end of this step, the desired objective is to determine in which party (coalition) the Dutch should support in order to achieve its national goals.

Step 4. Strategy Development:

The objective of this step is to establish which options are most acceptable in meeting the national objectives. With the development of this step, each option is linked to a specific "strategic end state" with an attached "packet of measures" that will afford the given option the best chance of success. Since in almost all cases, the Dutch will operate under the auspices of a coalition, it is important to consider options compatible with coalition partners. Thus, it becomes a coupling of Dutch interest with those of the coalitions.

Next is the development of what is referred to as a "zero-line scenario." The "zero-line scenario" is the "bottom line" acceptable outcome of the crisis to the coalition. It is the proverbial "line in the sand." Events based on this "zero-line scenario"

determine what is and what is not acceptable and in turn serve as the basis for the formulation of a strategy. Based on this scenario, the analysts formulate alternate scenarios and possible outcomes. The analysts establish from each of these outcomes what is acceptable. The most likely outcome is now utilized as the basis for further analysis. The analyst formulates an achievable end state in case the outcome is not acceptable. The analysts develop the most desired strategic end state, decides upon the measures to be used and determine which specific instruments are best used to achieve the end state. For each of the measures, the analysts must identify the long-term effect of the measure, how fast the measures will influence the target group and how long the measures can be sustained. In most cases, a combination of measures must be taken to achieve the desired end state. The analysts must keep in mind that instruments of power are more effective in some situations and not in others. Both positive and negative measures can be employed against a target group. How must the use of instruments of power be phased? Like any operation, specific, timed actions must be calculated in response to actions within specific periods if they are to be effective. Implementation of the measures could also be incrementally applied, increasing the pressure as needed. At the end of this phase, a number of options, strategic end states, and packet of measures) have been developed. Once accomplished, the analysts further screen the options by asking the questions: can it be executed and does it achieve the end state? From this step the analyst must select the best option to recommend.

Step 5. Risk Analysis:

In this step, the analysts must determine what risks are involved for each option.

This is the litmus test for these developed options. The analysts must ask of each option, the following questions:

- Are the decision makers willing to accept the degree of risk entailed by a particular option?
- Is the option practical and would it have the flexibility to satisfy another unforeseen outcome should it develop?
- Does the option fit the criteria established in order to achieve the desired end state?
- Does the option fit current developments, and if it does not, are the risks involved in continuing with this option acceptable now that the situation has changed?

Once these questions have been carefully considered, the analysts are prepared for the final step.

Step 6. The Recommendation:

The recommendation to the decision makers is presented in the following manner: First, the problem of the current situation, followed by a recommended option detailing what end state is to be achieved and the packet measures that are best suited for the purposes. Once presented, the decision rests with the decision makers.

In combination with the strategic analysis model, the Netherlands has developed a comprehensive set of military and political criteria for conducting military operations outside the NATO military area. It is important that the advisors to the decision makers indicate the extent to which the military operational criteria will be satisfied, if military intervention is to occur. The military planners must be given reasonable chances for success. If the operation satisfies the military operational criteria, then the political

criteria can be applied to the decision-making process. Once both criteria have been considered, the decision can be made. These criteria are incorporated into the Strategy development phase of the Strategic analysis model.

For the Netherlands, the decision on whether to intervene militarily or not comes down to basically a question of national interest and the preservation of international law and order. Having a systematic approach to crisis management is a relatively new phenomenon for the Dutch. The Dutch political and military leaders hope that through a logical and systematic approach to crisis management, they can avoid costly pit-falls in achieving their foreign and security policy objectives.

Table 2. 2 Dutch Military operational Criteria for operations outside of NATO

Source: Leesbundel "Crisis and Conflict," Instituut defensie leergangen, Rijswijk, Jul 1995.

1. Personnel, material and financial possibility
2. Coalition partners
3. Probability of escalation
4. Chance of success: clearly defined military objectives and can intervention achieve those objectives
5. Risks to Personnel
6. Length of operation
7. Geographic location of the crisis

Table 2.3 Dutch political criteria for operations outside of NATO

1. National interests
 - protection of home territory
 - regional security
 - impact of national interest on other nations
 - within the limits of international law
 - chance of conflict "spill-over"
 - support from an ally
 - special responsibilities toward other lands (historical bonds, etc.)

2. Wide political and public support for the action

IV. Conclusion:

In October 1995, while I attended the Royal Dutch Army's Staff Services Course, a strategic planning exercise involving a peace enforcement operation in a troubled third world land was conducted. The purpose of this exercise was to enhance newly acquired staff skills and practice implementing the strategic analysis model in a simulated crisis management operation. The implied task was to develop the intellectual foundation for the officers concerning a likely world trouble spot. Through the course of the exercise, considerable research was done forming an institutional base of knowledge about an area that in the future might involve the Dutch Army. The name of the exercise was "*Irbil*" and the operation was conducted in Northern Iraq.

Less than a year later, in August 1996, Kurdish factional fighting erupted, with one of the factions receiving military support from Saddam Hussein. The fighting centered on the Northern Iraqi provincial city of "*Irbil*." Just a coincidence? Not at all, the exercise was an example of the foresightedness of the Dutch Army. Officers at the Netherlands Defense College and the Ministry of Defense recognized that this is an area of ongoing crisis and conflict, and deserving of detailed analysis. The solutions derived from that exercise may not have solved the conflict, but every officer that departed that class understood the political, military and historical facets of the conflict and was better prepared because of it. This showed tremendous insight for a nation that has had little experience looking at the security concerns of the world and their impact on the

Netherlands.

In this chapter, I have outlined briefly the Dutch position regarding security cooperation with different international security institutions. The altered security situation in Europe has had consequences for different security institutions. The UN, NATO, the WEU and the CSCE are all set up to prevent and control conflicts. The Netherlands values an effective division of tasks among these organizations. The most important conclusion from this overview is that the Netherlands will always fulfill its security requirements within the context of one of these international organizations. Unilateral operations by the Dutch are not impossible. However, they are inconceivable even to the Dutch. The second conclusion is that NATO and the transatlantic link remain the foundation for Dutch security policy. The Dutch preference is for political and military cooperation within the framework of NATO, which is considered to be the organization best suited to maintain stability on the European continent. As an organization for collective defense, NATO has an integrated military structure and the necessary means and expertise to carry out its tasks. The Dutch are most comfortable with United States leadership in Europe. Third, the Dutch have taken a pragmatic view to the development of a European security identity through integration and expansion. The WEU is viewed as not a substitute organization for NATO but rather a complementary organization, one adding flexibility in crisis management.

The delineation of the Strategic analysis model elucidates one major aspect in the development of the new Dutch security policy. The very fact that a small nation such as the Netherlands has developed a logical and systematic approach to crisis management,

through the use of strategic analysis and comprehensive involvement criteria further illustrates this point. Dutch defense planners have developed this system to meet the needs of their new global security perspective required by its new security policy. In the next chapter, I will examine the changes made to the Dutch armed forces and their new mission capabilities which will allow them to take action globally if determined to be necessary by Dutch decision makers.

CHAPTER 3

"Let one world be the ideal, but let not that withhold us from doing what is necessary for the preservation of the Democratic way in the western sense."

-Elco N. van Kleffens

I. Introduction:

In the previous chapter, I discussed the Dutch government's position regarding international security cooperation, and the development of a new global security perspective. In this chapter, I will provide a description of the reorganization of the Dutch armed forces and the new missions they are expected to perform within these new security arrangements. The new structure within each of the branches of the armed forces will also be delineated. Additionally, the Defense budget for 1996-1997 will be examined in general terms, identifying the impact of the budget on the restructuring of the armed forces. Finally, an explanation will be given as to why these changes constitute more than simply a modernization program, the types of weapons systems reflecting the mission requirements of the new Dutch security policy.

In April of 1995, the government of the Netherlands agreed to purchase from the United States 30 AH-64D Apache *Longbow* attack helicopters. The most sophisticated attack helicopter in the world, the Apache was designed to defeat Soviet tanks racing across Europe in an apocalyptic World War III. The cost of this purchase was 1.3 million Dutch Guilders. The decision to purchase the helicopter was not popular with fellow European Union members. The "European made" attack helicopter, the Franco-

German venture, "Tyger" was designed to meet the need for providing an attack helicopter and revive a sagging European defense industry. Why then did the Dutch purchase the Apache? The answer is that the Dutch government is serious about its commitment to preserving world security. As we shall see, the Apache is only one example of the many new weapons systems that will significantly enhance the capabilities of the Dutch armed forces.

II. Reorganization of the Armed Forces:

General:

The Dutch armed forces have essentially three main tasks. First is to maintain or restore international order by contributing to crisis management operations, including the delivery of rapid deployment units, for use in an international framework outside the NATO treaty area, legitimized by the UN and/or the CSCE. Second is to make an adequate contribution to allied defense of NATO. Finally, the third mission of the Dutch armed forces is to protect the territory, airspace and the territorial waters of the Kingdom (the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.)¹ In order to achieve these operational requirements, the Dutch armed forces is being reorganized into a force structure that satisfies the requirements for flexibility, mobility, inter-operability and multi-functionality. As long as the Kingdom of the Netherlands or the NATO treaty area are not threatened, the Dutch have given priority to engaging in crisis management operations. Since direct threats to the survival of NATO and the Netherlands are remote,

¹Theo van den Doel "A Review of Dutch Defense Policy," Restructuring Armed Forces in the East and West (San Francisco: Westview Press, Inc., 1994) 62.

the Dutch have restructured their armed forces to suit operations involving peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance, keeping in line with the new mission requirements for NATO.

In the near future (the target year is 2000), the Dutch armed forces have set the following mission parameters and will be capable of:

-Maintaining a capacity for simultaneous participation in a maximum of four peacekeeping operations under the flag of the UN, the CSCE or the WEU. In any given situation, the contributions will have the size of a battalion or equivalent, (for instance, two frigates, or a fighter squadron.) Alternately, a substantial contribution in the form of support units may be offered. The armed forces will have the capacity to sustain operations (at the low intensity scale of the crisis management spectrum) for a maximum of three years.² The norm for sending out personnel is once every one and a half years for a period of six months. This equates to two units available for training and replacement for each unit deployed. Additionally, the Netherlands may take part in peace operations on a smaller scale, for example by sending out observers and by providing humanitarian assistance.³

- Maintaining rapidly deployable assets in peacetime for the protection of the NATO

²Four battalion sized operations sustained for three years would put considerable strain on the resources of the Netherlands, it can however theoretically be done.

³Defense Priorities Review (Ministry of Defense, The Hague, 1991), 6.

treaty area and for adequate and effective contributions to peace enforcement operations.⁴

For these purposes, larger units would be necessary, such as the Airmobile brigade, a light or mechanized brigade, a maritime operational group, three fighter aircraft groups or a combination of the three. This is based on the assumption of a once-only deployment in a particular crisis.

-Maintaining the capacity and the infrastructure to generate sufficient forces for the allied defense in the event of a major threat against NATO. Although possible, any significant threat to NATO would entail a reduced enemy potential and a considerably longer warning time, allowing a sufficient pre-hostilities buildup.

Size of the Armed Forces:

Of paramount importance to the new defense organization is the effectiveness and the rapid deployability of units intended for crisis management operations. To some degree, all units of the Royal Netherlands Army remain dependant on mobilization. However, units earmarked for rapid deployment are kept to sufficient manning levels to allow their deployment without significant prior mobilization. Some filling of key military occupational specialties would be necessary. Overall, rapid deployment units are capable of deployment on short notice.

It is partly because of the need for responsive, and flexible, units that the Dutch government has opted for an all-volunteer force. All things considered, the requisite

⁴This is a recent development. During the Gulf War, the Netherlands declined to contribute ground forces to the coalition, presumably because the Dutch forces were inadequately prepared for peace enforcement operations.

flexibility can best be achieved with an organization consisting of professional personnel. This issue will be addressed in detail in the next chapter, but in general, the Dutch government believes that the armed forces can continue to fill their mission requirements consisting exclusively of personnel serving on a voluntary basis.⁵

Once the reorganizations have been completed in the year 2000, the peacetime strength of the Dutch armed forces will total approximately 70,000 personnel (including civilians) of which 17,500 are with the Royal Navy, more than 36,000 with the Royal Army, more than 13,000 with the Royal Air force, and 3,600 with the Royal Marechaussee, the Dutch military constabulary. In case of a major conflict, the Navy and the Air force will need limited capacity to generate additional units. Under these circumstances, the wartime organizations will be activated and additional personnel called up from the reserves. By 1998, the armed forces can be augmented to over 110,000 personnel in a major conflict with approximately 23,700 with the Royal Navy, 60,000 with the Royal Army, 21,000 with the Royal Air force and 4,500 with the Royal Marechaussee.⁶

The Royal Navy:

Being a seafaring nation, the Dutch Navy has been historically held in high regard among the four armed forces. Dutch naval units are part of NATO's multinational naval

⁵The debate continues as to whether the Dutch armed forces can sufficiently fill the ranks with volunteers. Additionally, the Ministry of Defense set a target goal for women in the armed forces at 8% of the total force. Currently the percentage is 5%.

⁶Defense Priorities Review, 8.

forces, such as Standing Naval Force Atlantic, Standing Naval Force Channel, and Standing Naval Force Mediterranean. The Dutch government has recognized that naval forces are well adapted to the new security situation. Naval forces are by nature mobile and flexible, both strategically and factually and well suited for "showing the flag." During Desert Storm, all branches of the Dutch armed forces contributed to the coalition effort however, it was the naval contingent that made up the only substantial contribution. The altered security situation has no consequences in a qualitative sense (only in the quantitative sense) for the organization, structure, and resources of the Dutch Navy.⁷ The prospects in the maritime force structure are better than before 1991, when the Soviet Union still existed. The reduced threat now justifies a lower operational availability and ultimately, the disposal of a number of warships. The Dutch Navy functions in task forces which operate independently or in conjunction with its NATO counterparts. A maritime task force usually consists of a frigate for command and control, an air defense frigate, six frigates, a supply ship, ten helicopters, six P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft and two submarines.⁸ Because of the reduced naval threat posed by the former Soviet Union, the Navy will be able to reduce the number of operational naval task forces.

Thus, the Dutch Navy will continue to maintain this capability and its present structure in order to provide a wide range of resources for various types of operations in

⁷Theo van den Doel "A Review of Dutch Defense Policy," 62.

⁸Ibid.

the future. The adaptation of the navy to the new security situation will affect mainly the number of assets available for the task forces and the mine services. The number of personnel is to be reduced by approximately 25% by the year 2000 and one complete naval task force is being eliminated.

The operational strength of the Royal Dutch Marine Corps will remain unchanged. The Dutch Marines are considered the most combat ready forces within the Dutch armed forces and are frequently deployed on operations worldwide. The Dutch Marines also contribute to the NATO Combined UK-Netherlands Landing Force, and train frequently with their UK counterparts, the British Royal Marines. The Marines new Amphibious transport ship remains a spearhead investment project for the Ministry of Defense.

Reductions in the Dutch navy will also include cancellation of the new coastal minesweepers (an operation for which the navy earned a considerable reputation), a reduction in the number of modernization programs and reductions in costly munitions programs.

Table 3.1 the Netherlands Navy Structure 2000 (Active Forces)

Source: Defense White Paper, 1991, Defense Priorities Review, 1993.

	<i>Defense White Paper (1991)</i>	<i>Force 2000</i>
Frigates	16	16
Supply ships	2	2
Submarines	4	4
Patrol Aircraft	13	13
Helicopters	20	20
Minesweepers	21	17
Amphibious ships	0	1

The Royal Army:

By the year 2000, the Dutch army's structure will be reduced by 54%. This reduction is possible because of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) and the Conventional Forces Europe One (CFE-1) agreements. Implementation of the CFE agreements, changes to the security environment and the assumption by NATO of new mission requirements has resulted in the restructuring of the Dutch army. To meet the new requirements for mobility and flexibility, an Airmobile Brigade (*11 Luchtmobiele Brigade*) has been established and is operational. This new formation constitutes the Army's premier Rapid Deployment Force and a major contribution to crisis management operations.⁹ The Airmobile Brigade is the Dutch contribution to the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps' Multi-National Division.

From 1998 on, conscription will be abolished, and the entire army will consist of a volunteer force. The restructured Army will consist of a combined Army Corps with the Germans (one Dutch division and two German divisions), with the Corps headquarters located in Münster, Germany. The structure of the brigades and the equipment will be more suitable for flexible and rapid deployment within a multinational context. The new force structure will emphasize a small, but adequate, active force with fewer reserve units. There will be a shift from heavy equipped to lighter, more mobile units. The result is expected to be a more favorable relationship between combat and

⁹This Brigade has seen extensive service in the former Yugoslavia.

combat support units (teeth to tail ratio.)¹⁰

The Army's resulting peacetime strength will therefore amount to 36,000 personnel including 10,700 civilians. The Defense White Paper of 1991 called for a wartime Army establishment of over 140,000, mainly conscripted personnel. As the reorganization progresses, the wartime organization will gradually decrease to approximately 60,000 exclusively regular and reserve personnel by the year 2000.

The reorganization and the reductions in troop strengths will result in the closure of a large number of Army complexes and installations. In addition to a number of smaller complexes, 13 major Army installations have or will have closed by the end of 1997, with eight additional Army installations under consideration for closure by the year 2000.

Table 3.2 the Netherlands Army Structure 2000 (Active Forces)

Source: Defense White Paper, 1991, Defense Priorities Review, 1993.

Defense White Paper (1991)

2 Divisions (one active, one reserve)

* 3 Mechanized Brigades

* (combat)support units

* 1 Airmobile Brigade

Force 2000

1 Division consisting of

* 1 Mechanized Brigade

* 1 Light(mech) Brigade

* (combat) support units

* 1 Mechanized Brigade (reserve)

* 1 Airmobile Brigade

The Royal Air Force:

The tasks of the Royal Air Force consist of combat air patrols, air defense (both

¹⁰Theo van den Doel "A Review of Dutch Defense Policy", 63.

surface-to-air and air-to-air), combat support for both land and sea forces, air reconnaissance and air transport.¹¹ The further realignment of the Air Force with the new security situation will mainly affect the number of fighter aircraft and the need for increased air mobility. By the year 2000, the peacetime strength of the Air force will decrease by 34%. The number of F-16 aircraft assigned to NATO has been reduced from 144 to 108. As a result, two F-16 squadrons (a total of 36 aircraft) will be disbanded in 1997. Additionally, the number of flying hours (non-operational) is to be reduced by approximately 18%.¹² This decision, combined with the effects of air-refueling (equaling to fewer takeoffs) have been designed to save money and reduce the environmental impact of these flights. Planned mid-life upgrades of the current F-16 fleet are proceeding but at a reduced progress rate.

Royal Marechaussee:

The Dutch military constabulary is responsible for all military police and security requirements to support the Dutch armed forces. A combination of military unit and police force, the Marechaussee has such diverse responsibilities as providing security for the Royal family to providing security for the airport at Schiphol near Amsterdam. Currently the Marechaussee will remain at present strengths, and expect to receive additional augmentation to support its increased role in airport security.

¹¹The Air Force maintained a small nuclear strike capability as part of the overall NATO nuclear deterrent. However, the Dutch no longer actively train for this mission.

¹²Theo van den Doel "A Review of Dutch Defense Policy", 64.

III. The Defense Budget 1996-1997

General:

The 1996-1997 Defense budget offers in general good prospects for the Dutch defense organization. To balance between cutting costs in the area of defense and yet providing the restructured armed forces with the necessary equipment has been challenging. The first results of efficiency operations demonstrated that intended savings can be achieved without affecting combat power. By 1996, important investment decisions will have been implemented, including the procurement of thirty AH-64D Apache helicopters and the construction of two air defense and command frigates. During the next few years, the advanced equipment required for the reorganization and its new missions will enter service.

More than ever before, the Dutch armed forces will be called upon to contribute to security operations worldwide. The Ministry of Defense is currently considering, in consultation with other Ministries, in what way and under which conditions its contributions to these types of activities can be continued and perhaps expanded. The point of departure will be that the availability of personnel and equipment for the main defense tasks will not be jeopardized. Attention will also be paid to the cost aspect. Thus, it will be assumed that these activities will be financed by third parties (i.e., the United Nations.)¹³

¹³*Rijksbegroting 1996, The Hague 6.*

Finances:

According a government coalition agreement, the Defense budget is to be cut by NLG 580.7 million for 1996. The 1995 budget included measures which will result in a total amount of NLG 299.0 million being saved in 1996-1997. The remaining sum of NLG 281.7 million will therefore have to be found in the 1996 budget. The Defense White Paper 1991 indicated the outline of the new financial parameters of defense policy. A decision was then taken to abandon the cumulative nature of the growth method. For future defense long range planning a constant budget level will exist.¹⁴

Table 3.3 Budget Projection

Source: Defense Priorities Review 1993 (-numbers based on 1992, wage level/1993 Price level; amount in NLG million.)

Defense Priorities Review	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Central Organization	2,967.2	2,886.3	2,862.1	2,842.8	2,796.8
Navy	2,612.5	2,525.6	2,595.6	2,691.8	2,819.4
Army	4,886.0	4,948.3	4,907.2	4,623.1	4,723.8
Air Force	2,653.7	2,963.3	3,032.3	3,231.7	3,027.7
Mare-chaussee	295.4	290.5	288.8	277.7	271.9
Total	13,414.8	13,614.0	13,686.0	13,667.1	13,639.6

Defense Savings:

The Parliament was informed that savings could be implemented by including the following measures:

-delaying the Defense soil cleanup programs (NLG 25 million)

¹⁴Ibid. , 3.

- extra revenue from equipment to be decommissioned (NLG 50 million)
- realization of the targets with regard to subsidies (NLG 1.3 million)
- 32 hour work week jobs (NLG 12.3 million); external services (NLG 8.9 million) and procurement policy (NLG 38.8 million).

Even with these reductions, NLG110.4 million remains to be cut from the 1996-1997 budget. This remaining deficit, however, will be carried over into 1997-1998. The solutions for reducing this amount have been found in the areas of both investment and operating costs. Cuts will continue until the target goal of 1,580.7 million guilders is reached. The single most important aspect in achieving the budget reduction of NLG 580.7 million is that it will have no planned consequences for the operational combat power of the armed forces. However, there will be consequences for the following equipment projects after 1998.

- the air defense and command frigates
- the replacement minesweeper capacity
- the replacement of transport vehicles
- F-16 upgrades
- light reconnaissance and surveillance vehicles
- vehicles for UN operations

The government has added NLG 22.5 million to the defense budget to finance the deployment of 225 Marechaussee personnel at Schiphol Airport. This amount may increase if more personnel are deployed to augment security at the airport.

Financing Peace Operations:

The expenditure for peace operations for 1995-1996 was estimated to be NLG 32 million. This includes UN contributions totaling NLG 61.3 million and NLG 259.7

million for additional expenses. It is estimated that receipts will amount to NLG 125.3 million, including the contributions made by development cooperation (NLG 61.3 million), and the UN's reimbursement and receipts for Dutch participation in the Multinational Forces of Observers (MFO) in the Sinai.¹⁵ The UN reimbursement, to be prepaid by Defense in 1995-1996, will amount to NLG 62 million. Additional expenditures for peace operations are difficult to estimate because of the uncertainty about the scope and duration of Dutch involvement.

In view of recent contributions (Haiti, Cambodia, former Yugoslavia), a structured funding provision has been included since 1995 for offsetting costs of involvement in peace operations. For 1996, a total of NLG 298.3 million was reserved for these operations. This includes NLG 61.3 million for UN contributions and a structural amount of NLG 237 million for additional expenditures. It is estimated that ongoing and anticipated operations will entail a total sum of NLG 120.3 million in 1996-1997. The UN is considering, in consultation with the troop supplying countries, whether a lease concept might be developed for personnel and equipment involved in these operations. The Netherlands is actively involved in those deliberations.

Currency Management:

For the purpose of making international payments, the Ministry of Defense(MOD) must possess foreign currencies. The MOD uses currency futures to minimize exchange rate risks. The Netherlands has seven forward dollar contracts,

¹⁵ Netherlands Defense Budget 1996-1997.

totaling \$2,131 million with the United States. The dollars that become available will be used for:

- the procurement of the new Chinook Helicopter
- modifications of the older model Chinook Helicopters
- procurement of C-130 transport aircraft
- modifications of the KDC-10 aircraft (refueling/transport)
- procurement of small caliber arms
- procurement of the AH-64D Attack Helicopter¹⁶

Budget Impact on the Reorganization:

The Royal Navy:

The reduction in the defense budget will mainly affect the Royal Navy in the area of personnel and some shipbuilding projects. The Royal Navy personnel reductions will amount to 17.6 % at the end of 1997, while the Defense Priorities Review forecast a reduction by this time of 18.1%. The explanatory memorandum to the 1995 budget included a summary of projects that were deemed necessary for the reorganization of the Navy and thus were to be safeguarded from further reductions. They included:

- Cooperation between the Naval dockyards and the new SEWACO company in Den Helder
- Decentralization of personnel responsibilities
- Further Belgo-Dutch Naval integration and cooperation

Equipment:

Additional cost-cutting measures involved the deactivation and transfer of ownership of several Dutch frigates. In March 1995, ownership of HNLMS *Van Kinsbergen*, the third frigate in a series of three warships, was turned over to Greece.

¹⁶Ibid. , 6.

Agreement has also been reached with Greece regarding the transfer of a fourth frigate, HNLMS *Kortenaer*. On 30 June 1995, a contract was signed for the construction of two air defense and command frigates by the Royal Scheldt Group, as replacements for the two decommissioned frigates, HNLMS *Tromp* and *De Ruyter*. This particular project involves cooperation with Germany and Spain and the project's budget amount is NLG 1,684 million.¹⁷

In other Naval developments, the results of the joint study conducted in cooperation with Germany into a replacement minesweeping capacity, the *Troika Sweeping System*, have been submitted to the parliament for review in the first quarter of 1997. All eight multipurpose frigates will be fully operational and deployable in 1996-1997. The *Walrus* project involving the construction of two series of *Walrus*-class submarines, (each series containing two submarines) is expected to be concluded this year. The total expenditure for this project is currently estimated at NLG 1,999 million. The amphibious transport ship HNLMS *Rotterdam* will be transferred to the Navy at the end of 1997. Total expenditure for this project is estimated at NLG 279 million.

The Royal Army:

Some three hundred reorganization projects are to be concluded in the 1996-1997 Defense Budget for the Army. Additionally 120 projects will be in the preparatory or decision-making stage, with another 150 projects taking place.¹⁸ The staff of the Dutch

¹⁷Ibid. , 9.

¹⁸Ibid. , 11.

Army is to undergo a reorganization process at the end of 1997, and will consist of an Army Staff (for policy making), a Crisis Staff and two central executives services (for personnel and equipment.)

The personnel complement of these staffs and services is to be reduced, by transferring tasks and authority to the three executive sectors: the Dutch contingent of the Dutch-German Corps, the Training Command, and the National Command. Within the Army Corps, units which are currently manned with conscripts are being reorganized and manned by regular army personnel. These battalion-sized units will be fully deployable after a period of six months.

The Army's large diversity in tasks necessitates efficient use of its reserve components, a task which the Dutch have taken to heart. The Dutch Army is working to increase its flexibility by providing more openings for the deployment of reserve personnel, and even MOD civilians, in crisis management operations on an individual, voluntary basis. Examples of this might include specialized personnel, with special skills needed in humanitarian or nation-building missions such as civil engineers or legal experts. The deployment of reserve personnel could include service as UN observers or for backfilling important vacancies arising as the result of regular military personnel being deployed abroad.

Equipment:

The requirement of vehicles for UN operations, initially set at a standard number of 100, has been readjusted to 70 vehicles. In December 1994, the Netherlands and Germany signed a contract for the joint development of four prototype light

reconnaissance vehicles. Furthermore an option has been taken on the serial production of a minimum of 218 and maximum of 238 vehicles. These vehicles anticipated use is primarily in support of peace operations. The vehicles are expected to enter service from 1998 onward. Additional procurement projects for the Army include new individual equipment (U.S. style Kevlar helmets) for its soldiers (NLG 25 million), an improved combat communications system (NLG 1 billion), unmanned, remotely piloted reconnaissance drones (130 million) and the new C-7 Automatic Rifle, which will replace older FLN Rifles and Uzi sub-machine guns as the main small arm in the Dutch inventory.

The Royal Air Force:

The Defense Budget has mainly impacted on the Air Forces' management system, and the acquisition of new air mobility assets. The reorganization has been geared to improving the management of the Air Force by means of a new operational-logistic method of operation. The squadrons will be given a more autonomous role, primarily because support for crisis management operations is not usually launched from national bases. The reorganization has also prompted the relocation of forward deployed air defense assets, two guided missile groups, (which are under the Air Force's responsibility) from Germany back to the Netherlands.

Equipment:

The F-16 Fighter Mid-Life Update (MLU) project is proceeding, but at a slower rate. The project is a joint project involving Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States. Two F-16's are to be provided with an MLU package as

part of the development phase and (the MLU has since been carried out on one of these aircraft) the latter aircraft will be used to test the modification package. The MLU will significantly increase the Dutch F-16's combat capabilities, improving its avionics, navigation and weapon's delivery systems. A total of 136 aircraft will be modified by the year 2000. Fixed prices have been negotiated with the supplier Lockheed Corporation, thus greatly reducing the risk of cost overruns. Estimated expenditures for the production phase amount to NLG 1,485 million.¹⁹

To increase mobility for the worldwide deployment of Dutch forces, the Defense Budget has allocated funding for the purchase and upgrade of both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. Two DC-10-30CF aircraft (KDC-10) are being adapted for military transport tasks and aerial refueling. The project expenditures for the KDC-10 have run over budget at a total cost of NLG 403 million. The project expenditure for the two C-130H Hercules transport aircraft amounts to NLG 222 million. The four Fokker-60 utility transport aircraft have been delivered and are operational. The procurement cost involved a sum of NLG 298 million. All helicopters fall under the Air Forces responsibility. Seven Chinook transport helicopters have been procured from the Canadian government and are being upgraded to the standards of the CH-47D (currently used in the U.S. inventory.) Six new Chinook helicopters have been purchased and will be delivered in 1998. Total amounts for this project are NLG 822 million. The procurement of seventeen Cougar light transport helicopters cost in total NLG 461

¹⁹Ibid. , 14.

million. Eight have been delivered and are operational and nine will be delivered in 1997. The total investment expenditure for transport helicopters amounts to NLG 1,283 million. The agreement on delivery of the 30 AH-64 Apache Longbow Attack helicopter was signed on 24 May 1995. The low exchange rate of the dollar resulted in a decrease in the required budget and was a contributing factor to the Dutch decision to buy American.

IV. New Capabilities of the Restructured Armed Forces:

The period from 1995 until the year 2000 is a pivotal period in the evolution of Dutch security policy. The changes in the armed forces missions and the impact of reductions in defense expenditures have been expressed by the types of new equipment purchased by the Dutch government. This new equipment and weapons systems afford new defense capabilities and enhance the options of Dutch security policy. During the past few years, important investment decisions have been made to improve the mobility and flexibility of the Dutch armed forces. These investments represent more than an equipment modernization program, they reflect the altered security situation and they represent attempts to fill voids that existed in past defense organizations. These investments represent a departure from the old cold war security mentality of the Dutch to a new, progressive and strategic outlook. The new equipment and weapons systems reflect the new tenets of Dutch security policy and its expanding commitment to bring quality contributions to peace operations.

Dutch defense planners have recognized the need for mobility and not counting on support from allies, to deploy their forces where needed. Prior to 1996, the Dutch

have never possessed such a capability. All transport aircraft are now fully operational, giving the Dutch both a Strategic (KDC-10) and Tactical (C-130H, F-60U) fixed-wing airlift capability. The KDC-10 aircraft will also give the Dutch the ability to refuel their F-16 fighters, greatly extending the combat radius of these aircraft. With the improved F-16's, the Dutch will possess a true all-weather, limited visibility fighter/bomber, capable of delivering a variety of munitions including so called laser guided "smart bombs."

From 1996 on, the first rotary-wing, medium and light transport helicopters became available to support the operations of the 11th Airmobile Brigade. The Dutch now have a light infantry force capable of participating in both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. In addition to transport helicopters, the United States will make 12 AH-64 Apaches available in the interim for training purposes until the 30 AH-64D model Apaches arrive. The Apache will provide the Airmobile Brigade with significant combat power needed to support participation in any type of operation, including combat operations. The Apache can fulfill its main defense role and yet provide the combination of flexibility and fire power needed.

In 1997, the amphibious transport ship *Rotterdam* will enter service. This modern roll-on-roll-off transport ship has the capacity to delivery a combat loaded (vehicles and equipment) Marine battalion anywhere in the world. The roll-on-roll-off capability is significant, allowing for rapid introduction of forces into the area of operations and allow for rapid turn-around time.

The Dutch know that success on the modern battlefield and in peace operations

depends on timely intelligence and reliable secure communications. The Dutch are currently fielding a new, improved tactical communications (Combat) radio, purchased from the French. This radio system allows for secure tactical radio communications utilizing a "frequency hopping system." The radio changes frequencies so quickly that it is virtually impossible to locate, acquire and jam the frequency used. At the strategic and operational levels, the Dutch are involved in a joint European venture, (under French leadership) to launch by the year 2000 its own military communication satellite (MILSAT). Currently the Dutch armed forces must rely on unsecure commercial satellite communications or request use of United States assets for its remotely deployed forces. In theory, after the year 2000, the Dutch, along with other WEU nations, will have reliable, secure, real-time satellite communications for military operations. In the area of combat intelligence the Dutch have purchased and are fielding Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV). These small drone aircraft are designed to operate forward of friendly units conducting reconnaissance. These RPV's provide the Dutch ground commander with real-time combat information data, including closed circuit television imagery. The Dutch are also considering the purchase of a British helicopter-mounted version of a Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) similar, but smaller than the U.S. version of Desert Storm acclaim. The SLAR will allow detection and tracking of multiple ground targets.

All of these new systems significantly expand the capabilities of the Dutch armed forces. Relative to the size of the country, these new weapons systems and equipment represent a major investment by the Dutch government in meeting the needs of the new

security environment. The Dutch now have the necessary means to contribute (on a relative scale) to any type of future operation in which they may be called upon to execute.

V. Conclusion:

The conclusions drawn from the evaluation of the international security situation has prompted the restructuring of the armed forces. Although the traditional threat of a major surprise attack has significantly diminished, current crisis and conflicts appear even more difficult to anticipate. This has placed a greater demand on the military's ability to adequately respond to these types of conflicts. The restructured armed forces and the investment in weapon systems and equipment are designed to give the Dutch armed forces the mobility and flexibility to respond to these conflicts.

The financial situation of the Dutch defense will remain a major concern for the coming years. The defense budget has been decreased by almost 20% compared to 1989. However, the ambitious weapons procurement plans could be affected by unforeseen costs, particularly when funding peace operations. Further cuts will degrade the balance in reorganization plans. Currently all major Dutch political parties support the restructuring program. However, in the Netherlands a coalition of parties form the government, and compromise on defense expenditures is inevitable. The Dutch armed forces find themselves in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the political decision makers and parliament require the military too play a more active role, providing a viable military option, and yet as we have seen, the government also remains reluctant to part with guilders for defense, in spite of the operational tempo to complete the necessary

restructuring. In sum, the restructured armed forces of the Netherlands will be a smaller, more professional force with the training, and now the equipment, to accomplish a myriad of tasks. However, in the next chapter, I will discuss two potential stumbling blocks that could adversely effect the success of the defense restructuring; the constraints and further cuts to the defense budget and the lack of public support for these defense initiatives.

CHAPTER 4

"What's more, the Armed Forces should propagate a challenging image to the outside world, to make it an attractive option to be a soldier."

Air-Commodore B. A. C. Droste
Deputy Chief of Defense Staff for National Plans

I. Introduction:

In the previous chapter, I examined the restructuring of the Dutch armed forces and presented the new and improved capabilities of those forces. The restructuring of the armed forces has enhanced Dutch security policy, making it a credible force. These changes however, are not carved in stone. The triumph of the new Dutch security policy will depend largely on the Dutch people. In this chapter, I will discuss the relationship between the Dutch armed forces and Dutch society. I will address the transition from conscript armed forces, to a professional, "all volunteer" force and examine the motivating factors behind the decision.

Additionally, I will discuss in general terms the public perceptions of the Dutch armed forces and illuminate some of the social implications of the new Dutch foreign and security policy and defense restructuring. I maintain that without the support of the Dutch public, the new Dutch security policy will only be marginally successful. If the Dutch people are unwilling to volunteer for service and fill the ranks of the newly restructured

force, then the Dutch government will be forced to continue to rely on conscripted soldiers, degrading its ability to deploy its forces in support of world-wide crisis management operations, which is a fundamental tenant of the new security policy. Secondly, if the increased military involvement associated with the new security policy equates to high costs, both financially and in terms of lives, the support of the public will be essential for the continuation of such operations.

A few years ago, the possibility of performing extended long-term military operations outside the NATO treaty area was an unthinkable "option" for the Dutch armed forces. Today, the Dutch government has directed the Dutch armed forces to prepare for these new missions. Accordingly, the Dutch armed forces have geared their entire restructuring efforts to respond to crisis management operations. These operations require Dutch forces to deploy throughout the world. In order to accomplish its missions, the armed forces must be rapidly deployable and manned with highly motivated, well trained, professional soldiers. For Dutch defense planners, two questions dominate the future success of the defense restructuring: What do these types of operations mean in terms of the quality and quantity of future force structures and will the public support the necessary changes? Success of the new Dutch security policy and the defense restructuring rests overwhelmingly with the Dutch people in terms of both their willingness to support the operations and the public's willingness to fill the ranks of the new force structure.

II. Transition to an "All Volunteer Force":

General:

What are the underlying reasons for the decision to abandon conscription in favor of

a professional army? For many Dutch political and military leaders, the primary argument in favor of maintaining conscription has been the same argument used since the beginning of the Cold War, defense of the *vaderland* and compulsory service are a public responsibility. For advocates of conscription, the defense of the Netherlands has always been a pragmatic responsibility and conscription a "necessary evil" in preserving peace. In addition to the argument that military service is a public responsibility, proponents of conscription argue that a military made up of conscripts is more reflective of the society. Conscription thus serves as the common thread between Dutch society and the military, making the military truly representative of the society that it defends.

In spite of these arguments, however, with the end of the Cold War, the need for conscription came under close scrutiny. Justification for maintaining conscription as a tenet of Dutch security policy appeared less and less relevant, and more relevant questions surfaced. Questions such as whether sufficient strengths for wartime and peacetime were necessary, was there continued support for conscription in view of the new security situation, and could sufficient numbers of volunteers be recruited in place of conscripts.

In light of the security risks, reductions in the *numbers* of troops are reasonably justifiable. Large numbers of troops needed to counter a major conventional conflict in Europe are simply not needed. Thus, the Dutch armed forces wartime planning strengths are no longer determining factors for their new restructured peacetime organizations. According to Minister of Defense Relus ter Beek, the fundamental question remaining then was whether the Dutch armed forces still required conscripts to meet the needs of the force

after restructuring or whether preference should be given to all volunteer forces.¹

Conscription or All-Volunteer Force?

Two considerations played a key role in the decision to adopt an all-volunteer armed forces. Those considerations were deployability of the force and the defense budget. As we have seen, the analysis of the current European security situation has led the Dutch government to place more emphasis on the armed forces' capability to respond to crisis and conflict throughout the world. This has validated the need for the anticipated "draw down" of the Dutch armed forces. But in addition to downsizing, another important conclusion was reached from Dutch defense planners. The success of Dutch security policy depended on the need for *a large number of readily deployable units*.

Whereas during the Cold War all defense efforts were focused on a major single threat against Western Europe, under the defense reorganization Dutch units must now be prepared to conduct an array of operations under the general heading of crisis management. This new mission parameter requires armed forces which are more deployed and are capable of operating more effectively during peacetime and crisis situations. In principle, all operational Dutch units are capable of performing in crisis management operations. However, in reality, Dutch units consisting of conscripted personnel could not legally be deployed to conduct a crisis management operation.

Operational Deployability:

Under the current system, the Dutch Army is still largely filled with conscripted

¹H.A. Couzy, Mijn jaren als bevelhebber [My Years as Commander] (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Ljv 1996), 11.

personnel. Each active army battalion has a number of conscripts on "short-term" leave, meaning these personnel fill the unit manning rosters but are not physically present in garrison. Conscripted soldiers who are actually present are usually trained and take part in exercises as part of the overall unit training and readiness plan. This system leaves Dutch units staffed to adequately meet the needs for the Dutch commitments as part of overall NATO general defense plan (known as Mobile Counter-Concentration Defense or MCCD), but it constitutes a major obstacle in terms of deployability on a crisis management operation. Under current policy, conscripts cannot deploy outside the NATO treaty area unless they specifically volunteer for service abroad. Continuation of the existing policy involving the use of conscripted soldiers on a voluntary basis, is and would prove to be detrimental to what will increasingly become the main operational requirement of the armed forces: to carry out crisis management operations abroad.

Financial Considerations:

The financial aspects of maintaining a large conscripted army must also be considered. According to the findings from the Defense Review Commission (1991) headed by Wim Meijer, only an "all volunteer" force of the size proposed in the Defense Priorities Review would offer sufficient prerequisites to guarantee the quality of the armed forces in the long term.² Although maintaining conscription would account for larger armed forces, the costs involved would nevertheless erode the financial assets necessary for the qualitative improvements needed. More money to sustain the old conscription system

²Ibid. , 49.

prevents the procurement of the weapons systems and equipment needed to accomplish crisis management operations. As noted in previous chapters, these procurement projects will substantially improve the mission capabilities of the armed forces. Without them, the Dutch armed forces would be handicapped, adversely affecting mission success.

In sum, when the initial decision to end conscription was presented in the *Prioriteitennota 1992-1993* (a governmental review of defense priorities), a government committee was created to explore the issue. The initial response of the fact-finding committee was that conscription should be maintained on the basis that expected manpower requirements could not be sufficiently met through recruitment of regular personnel. Its findings were not based however on personnel requirements for the newly restructured force. The new armed forces structure required considerably less manpower. Accordingly, the Dutch government decided in favor of a professional force, albeit a small one, made up of volunteers. In light of these developments, the Dutch government has decided to suspend the obligation for compulsory military service in the Netherlands. The "All Volunteer Force" will officially become effective 1 January 1998. Conscription will not be completely abolished however. Should a major threat arise, reinstitution of conscription remains valid under general mobilization.

The Transition Period:

Immediate suspension of conscription and a short transition period would be in the best interests of the conscripts. Minister of Defense Ter Beek recognized the burdens entailed with national security, and concluded that the size and complexity of the reorganization mandated an extension of the policy in order to ease the turbulence of

transition.³ During the transition period, the Dutch government has been mainly guided by the need to preserve well functioning armed forces.⁴ If compulsory service had been abolished immediately, the entire process of reductions and reorganization would have become uncontrollable.

The current five year transition period is deemed necessary by defense planners in order to maintain positive control over the reorganization. If the required manning of the professional army appears unfeasible in the next few years, the government may extend the transition period until appropriate force levels can be achieved. In order to achieve the required recruiting levels, the Dutch recruiting effort would require constant attention and evaluation. To illustrate this point, if conscription had been officially stopped in 1996, an estimated 55% of the new army functions assigned for professional personnel would not have been filled.⁵

Based on the recommendations of the *Prioriteitennota 1992-1993*, new training methods and infrastructure requirements were put into effect for professional soldiers. Initial reaction to the influx of professional personnel was that "soldiers are soldiers" whether conscripts or volunteer. Professional recruits were treated and held to same low standards as the average Dutch conscripted soldier. Professional recruits were only required to meet the minimal basic training requirements in individual combat tasks such as

³Ibid., 55.

⁴Effective 1 July, 1994, the time Dutch army conscripts spent under arms was reduced from 12 to 9 months.

⁵Briefing presented by Air-Commodore Droste, 1996.

basic rifle marksmanship, land navigation, first aid training and military appearance and bearing. Minimal requirements were maintained and needless to say, these professional recruits felt unchallenged and poorly treated. Many opted not to extend their contracts. Since that time, efforts have been made to revamp training, and provide better facilities in order to attract and retain recruits. However, figures like those mentioned above raise concerns as to whether the armed forces can attract the quantity and quality of recruits needed.

Force Structure:

During consultations with NATO, the Dutch army was faced with the requirement of adding a fifth army brigade (for mobilization) to the new defense structure, with the intent of maintaining this force structure through the transition period (until 1998.) This option is currently under investigation; but the cost of 100 million guilders (approx. \$51 U.S. dollars)⁶ per year required to maintain this brigade will reduce financial planning flexibility. There are discussions at the ministerial level as to the need for this fifth brigade. Additionally discussions are ongoing as to whether this brigade should be made "readily available" for use in contingency operations. Financial realities will more than likely nullify this idea. Some Dutch officials have even proposed creating a sixth brigade, but neither the requirement nor the financial assets are viable.⁷ The Dutch are also examining new options for dealing with reserve forces, possibly leading to a concept

⁶Based on exchange rate of March 1997 at approximately 1.95 guilders to 1.00 U.S. dollar.

⁷Briefing presented by Air-Commodore Droste, 1996.

similar to the U.S. National Guard.

Manpower:

Another factor to be considered in the transition to an all-volunteer force is the recruitment of sufficient volunteers to meet the necessary manpower requirements.

Recruitment of personnel is a highly discussed topic. All conscript functions will have to be filled with regular personnel or be eliminated. Sufficient numbers of volunteers must be recruited and trained before these conscripted soldiers can be replaced. As long as the required numbers of professional personnel are not available, units filled with conscripted personnel will be maintained. Units will not be allowed to drop below required minimal manning strengths.

To employ ground forces for a peacekeeping operation, the Dutch currently have seven infantry-type battalions available, consisting of two marine battalions, three airmobile battalions and two armored battalions. These seven battalions can operate jointly and are interchangeable, or they can relieve each other in a long-term operation. There has been some discussion on the possibility of adding a third marine battalion and a third armored battalion to the force. However this would require an additional 170 million guilders per year and an additional recruitment effort that might be impossible to meet.⁸

In sum, the transition to a professional army will come with associated growing pains. The decision to make the transition is sound. However, the challenge will be in attracting high quality recruits and retaining them in the service for as long as possible. In

⁸Ibid.

order to successfully accomplish this, additional funding and infrastructure for recruiting will be needed.

III. The Army and Society:

General:

The relationship between the Dutch armed forces and the Dutch public is an evolving one. The Dutch armed forces is one of the largest employers in the Netherlands and accordingly, changes to Dutch attitudes and perspectives manifest themselves in the organizations of the armed forces. With this in mind, the Dutch armed forces has attempted to reflect Dutch society and have worked to improve its relationship with the general public. It has attempted to accomplish this in three areas: first by encouraging high quality young people from all walks of life to volunteer for service, second, by providing visible public service to society, and by helping to preserve the environment. As the social and demographic composition of the Netherlands changes, so does the character of the armed forces.

Recruiting:

In order to determine the prognosis for future recruiting requirements, a special *Commissie-Dienstplicht* (Conscription Commission) was established in 1991. The Commission conducted an extensive labor market investigation to contrast the needs of the armed forces with the available labor pool. Without question the recruiting needs of the armed forces have been measured and will increase once the transition period ends. The Dutch armed forces, particularly the Dutch army will require a number of professional, short-term contract (*beroepsmilitairen bepaalde-tijd or BBT*) personnel numbering about

9300 per year. However this number is considerably less than the initial 12, 514 recommended by the Conscription Commission. The following figures reflect the target recruiting goals of the armed forces for professional personnel, short-term contract on the basis of a two year contract:

-Royal Army	6,000
-Royal Navy	1,550
-Royal Air Force	1,450
-Marechaussee	300
Total:	9,300 ⁹

Based on the Conscription Commission analysis, this figure will adequately meet the recruiting requirements of the armed forces and is considered a realistic goal. The armed forces is making the conscious effort to recruit only the highest quality personnel and trying to avoid degradation in quality simply to meet the required numbers. The recruiting effort is sophisticated. In addition to its public relations effort, the Dutch armed forces runs a series of recruiting commercials on the television, particularly during prime time viewing. Recruiting posters can be seen in train stations and at bus stops throughout the Netherlands, and most of the major cities in the Netherlands have impressive armed forces recruiting stations. One army recruiting station in Breda that I visited not only offered information brochures, but ran videos of Apache helicopters in action, displayed Dutch army equipment and even had a mannequin outfitted in combat dress simulating a combat rappel from a hovering helicopter.

⁹Prioritietennota 1992-1993.

Women, Minorities and the Long-term unemployed:

Recruiting efforts will include the targeting for recruitment of more women, ethnic minorities, and long-term unemployed. The former Chief of Staff of the Dutch Army, LTG H. A. Couzy announced in 1995 the target goal by 1998 was to increase the percentage of women in the army from 5% to 8%.¹⁰ The problem however is that survey results from the Conscription Commission indicate there is very little interest in the military among women and minorities. One target group that does offer some promising prospects are the long-term unemployed. The armed forces offers excellent skill training in areas directly applicable to the civilian sector. Efforts to recruit unemployed Dutch labor attacks two issues at once. It helps to alleviate unemployment, and provides the armed forces with recruits. In addition, the armed forces also assists service personnel in their return to civilian society upon leaving the service. It affords short-term enlisted personnel excellent training opportunities which correspond to the demand of the civilian labor market.

In sum, the labor market is critical to the success of the Netherlands defense restructuring effort. Without sufficient manpower recruitment, the quality of the armed forces will be lacking. The armed forces needs a reliable and constant source of recruits if it is to successfully implement the changes called for in the defense restructuring. A dilemma does exist, as the armed forces broadens the recruiting base, the likelihood of lower quality recruits also increases.

¹⁰Briefing at the Instituut Defensie Leergangen, Hoofdvak Personeel Verzorging, Rijswijk, September 1995.

Public Service:

The armed forces routinely provides service personnel at the special request of various groups and organizations in the civilian society. The assistance these personnel can provide vary from laying bridges to loaning tents. During the *waterlood* (flooding emergency) of 1995 in Limburg, hundreds of combat engineer soldiers were dispatched to fill sand bags, repair broken or threatened dikes and levees, and to rescue stranded civilians.

In a more recent example, in January of 1997, Dutch support and medical units provided assistance to the *elfstedentocht* (a skating competition in which competitors skate along frozen canals encompassing 11 Dutch cities.) The Air force provided helicopter search teams to rescue stranded or exhausted competitors lost along the canals. In exchange for these emergency and public services performed, the Dutch armed forces hopes to receive positive publicity for their services. Occasions occur when other government organizations request the armed forces assistance in situations for which their own equipment or experience is inadequate. For example, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command has been called in on occasions to assist in the neutralization of ordnance remaining from the Second World War. In spite of all its disaster relief, humanitarian, and civic action tasks, the armed forces remains committed to and trained for their primary tasks.

The Environment:

In addition to its public service venue, the Dutch armed forces is devoting much attention to the preservation of the environment. Like the Dutch population in general, the armed forces tries to limit the environmental impact of its training and operations. In a

recent example, the Dutch army no longer uses or procures materials which damage the ozone layer, eliminating unnecessary residue that could release harmful substances into the atmosphere and by ensuring the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. The armed forces has also agreed to limit operations at the requests of environmentalists. The army has reduced live ammunition training and is utilizing simulators in place of conducting large-scale maneuver exercises. Training areas are held to strict environmental standards and efforts are made to preserve the flora and fauna in one of the most precious assets in the Netherlands, space for maneuver training areas.

In sum, efforts by the armed forces in recruiting, public service and preservation of the environment have helped to strengthen the bond between the armed forces and society. The recruiting effort has been geared towards attracting quality personnel to fill the ranks while at the same time, enhancing public awareness of the new Dutch armed forces. The best public relations tool however remains the professionalism displayed while providing services during such events as natural disasters or in support of public events. Being sensitive and willing to cooperate with the Dutch public's desire to preserve the environment also increases the standing of the armed forces with the Dutch people.

IV. Public Perception and the Media:

General:

As we have seen, the armed forces has worked to enhance their relationship with Dutch society. However, the new Dutch security policy has created the need for more comprehensive changes. There is a need to develop a new public perception of the Dutch military and subsequently the need to develop better relations with the Dutch media. As

LTG Couzy discussed in his book *Mijn jaren als bevelhebber*, the restructuring of the armed forces generated the need for a new military perspective among the Defense establishment and by Dutch society as well. The restructuring brought fundamental changes to the thinking of the Defense establishment and brought the armed forces increasingly into the limelight. New types of personnel, new social implications and the loss of jobs were all new and shocking experiences for the senior leadership in the defense establishment and for the Dutch citizens. Since the restructuring began in 1993, the Dutch military has taken tremendous strides in forging a new bond and in promoting a new mentality.

On 2 December 1993, General Couzy, (Chief of Staff of the Dutch Army at the time) invited ten civilian "Captains of Industry" from around the Netherlands to assist him and his staff developing the strategic vision, or more commonly known as the "mission statement" for the Dutch army.¹¹ This mission statement would have a direct impact on the operations and training of the newly restructured force. The fact that the senior leadership of the armed forces would solicit the assistance of civilian leaders truly reflects the desire to create a new and unique relationship. It also illustrates the lengths to which defense planners have gone to develop this new mentality towards the Dutch military.

A New Mentality:

At this time, there remains little public interest in the military. In 1996, a little over half of the professional armed forces personnel requirements would have been vacant

¹¹H. A. Couzy, *Mijn jaren als bevelhebber*, 120.

had it not been for conscripts.¹² Young men and women do not openly aspire to serve in the armed forces, nor are the armed forces held in high regard. The public perception of the military needs to be altered if the Dutch armed forces is to succeed. A "new mentality" regarding the military and service in the armed forces will be critical if the armed forces hopes to attract the quality and quantity of personnel needed.

Prior to the Cold War, public attention of the military was primarily grounded on issues related to contributions to NATO, (such as the controversy surrounding the deployment of Lance tactical nuclear missiles in the early 1980's.) Today, interest in the military and in military service remains tenuous. To help illustrate this point, in July 1995, the Dutch Air Force announced a shortage of fighter pilot recruitment and retention. There appeared to be little interest in the flight training programs among the general public. Retention of qualified F-16 fighter pilots was also difficult because of lucrative offers from the Dutch commercial airline KLM. Volunteers for service as fighter pilots were hard to find. In most countries, fighter pilots are held in high regard and pilot training a prestigious and highly sought after skill. (After the movie "Top Gun" most American ten year olds were likely to list "fighter pilot" as being among their top ten career choices.) Yet in the Netherlands, such a position is not nearly as revered as in the United States. This is of course a generalization, but it does reflect the lack of interest in the military.

There are also concerns that this new professional force will develop into a military sub-culture, isolated from Dutch society at large. There is the concern that with the

¹²Briefing presented by Air- Commodore Droste, 1996.

removal of conscription, the link between the military and the Dutch people will be severed. This is a possibility. With little to anchor it to Dutch society, the new all-volunteer force could become detached from the Dutch people. In the United Kingdom for example, over three generations of professional British soldiers have served under arms since the end of conscription in that country. Assessment from some of the senior leadership in the United Kingdom maintains that the professional army is out of touch with the British people. The British citizens care little for the service and is generally apathetic regarding defense issues. Prevalence of this kind of attitude in a country with a proud martial heritage like the United Kingdom has been echoed by General Couzy and other defense leaders.

Unlike its European neighbors, service in the military is not a time honored tradition and holds much less of a degree of respectability in the Netherlands. The Netherlands is a country that, unlike the United Kingdom, Germany and France, lacks a prominent military heritage. Although Dutch soldiers have fought with distinction in the past (particularly in the Seventeenth Century,) modern perceptions of the Dutch military have been generally unfavorable. In addition to the lack of a military heritage, the Netherlands has a strong tradition of pacifism, thus creating a strong cultural strain between Dutch society and the Dutch military. The Chiefs of the Dutch armed forces are working to change that perception. They are striving to portray the new all-volunteer force as a first-rate and highly professional force, in hopes that a new image, supported by professional conduct of its missions, will help to change the public's perception of its armed forces and encourage volunteers.

The Media:

Hardly a day passes were the Dutch military is not in the media. With the new developments in the armed forces, and a never before seen operational tempo, the frequency of contact between the military and Dutch society is growing. It has also placed the armed forces under the close scrutiny of the media. This has created a new challenge for the Dutch military, one learned through the hard knocks of experience. After the disaster in Srebrenica, and the subsequent negative media exposure, the armed forces identified the need for effective means of dealing with the press. The senior defense leaders realized that public opinion is vastly influenced by the media. As a result, extensive efforts to become "media savvy" have occurred. Dutch officers receive "media sensitivity training" as part of their overall officer professional development. Discussions and lectures on public relations are presented and the public relations lessons from Srebrenica driven home.¹³

The media has proven to be a double-edged sword for the armed forces. The Dutch military has recognized the dual nature of the media, and as an implied task has sought to use it as a positive instrument. Generally speaking, the Navy and the Air Force enjoy a much better reputation with the media, much to the consternation of the Army. However all of the branches of the armed forces have recognized the absolute necessity of positive

¹³The result of the negative and often distorted media representation regarding Srebrenica has embittered some of the more senior Army officers, and has certainly made many of the junior officers wary of the Press.

media coverage. Dutch media coverage of peace keeping and humanitarian assistance operations in Haiti, Cambodia, and Africa have boosted the image of the military. A positive image of professional armed forces serving with distinction is critical in garnering continued support from the politicians which control the purse strings, in terms of public support and certainly in terms of attracting quality recruits to serve.

Social Implications:

Perhaps the greatest social implication associated with the new defense policy and the restructuring involves the public support for this policy. In theory the tenets of the new security policy have the acceptance of the general public and there is a degree of consensus among the major political parties on most defense related issues. Are the costs associated with the implementation of these policies acceptable to the public? As seen in the "Criteria for Involvement" in Chapter Two, public opinion and support weigh heavily on the decision to send Dutch forces into harms way. Negative public opinion can be a paralyzing factor, thwarting any real attempts to make substantial contributions in preserving world peace. Today, the Dutch public is confronted with the question that all nations face when taking an active role in policing the world. Is the cost in terms of money and lives worth the effort? ¹⁴ Dutch soldiers, sailors and airmen are in harm's way throughout the world, and the mandates of the new security policy call for a readiness and *willingness* to fulfill that mission. The willingness to support remains to be seen.

¹⁴For the family of the Dutch Marechaussee killed by a crocodile in Africa on a peacekeeping operation in February 1997, it is particularly relevant, and likewise with the recent death of two soldiers in Bosnia.

If the new security policy is to succeed, it is the responsibility of the armed forces to change the perceptions of the public. The armed forces must be viewed as a professional, competent force capable of performing its mission. As General Couzy said:

"The Army must allow itself to be seen in that view. With open house days (at the garrisons), in television series, at large events but also by service to society, and in contact with the home front of the military personnel deployed."¹⁵

His comments reflect the need for the armed forces to take the initiative in changing public perception. Although the new security policy and force structure exists, the support of the public will determine its ultimate success.

V. Conclusion:

The emergence of the new Dutch security policy and defense restructuring has catapulted the nation's armed services into the nation's collective consciousness. Now more than, the Dutch citizen is more directly affected by the impact of the new security policy. With Dutch soldiers deployed throughout the world, public awareness and concern for these deployments has increased.

The Dutch are changing to an all volunteer force because of two factors, the "peace dividend" being a primary reason but also because of the need for increased flexibility in the force. Dutch conscript soldiers are legally unable to deploy outside of the NATO treaty area. The new mission parameters require a force capable of rapidly deploying world wide. Such capability can realistically exist only in a professional force.

¹⁵Translated text, Mijn jaren als bevelhebber, 179.

Accordingly, the armed forces have been making headway in changing the image and perception of the public and hope to attract a sufficient quality and quantity of recruits. If it appears unable to achieve this goal, the government is likely to continue some sort of short term conscription to keep up required force strengths.

The Dutch armed forces is representative of Dutch society and reflects the same social and cultural aspects that exist in the society as a whole. Various factors affect the relationship between the military and the Dutch people. Historical precedence and cultural norms have the greatest impact. The public support for the new security policy remains unclear at this time. However the military has recognized the need to change the perception of the military among the members of the Dutch public. The military has recognized the importance of the media and recognized the need of the armed forces to project a favorable impression through professional competence.

CONCLUSION

Since the end of the Cold War, the Netherlands has tried to come to terms with the new European security environment and has set a course toward restructuring its armed forces to meet the challenges of the new security situation. This remains a daunting task for Dutch political and military leaders alike. Based on the discussions in the preceding four chapters, in which various political, military, historical, cultural and socio-economic factors relating to the emergence of a new Netherlands security policy have been presented, the response to the question "what factors have contributed to the restructuring of the Dutch armed forces of the 21st century" have been addressed. A new Dutch foreign and security policy has emerged and a new force structure will exist by the year 2000.

The center of balance in Dutch foreign and security has shifted and a new foreign and security policy has emerged since the end of the Cold War. Although NATO remains the cornerstone of Dutch security policy, the focus of the new Dutch security policy is now on crisis management operations. This new security policy is centered on the execution of tasks in four areas; First, in the accomplishment of its NATO designated Main Defense responsibilities; Second, in the preservation of Dutch national and territorial interests; Third, in the execution of nationally mandated tasks such as disaster relief; Forth, in the execution of crisis management operations in support of international peace and stability. It is the execution of missions in this fourth area that have had the greatest impact in restructuring the Dutch armed forces.

With the new emphasis being on crisis management operations, the Dutch armed forces have been restructured to allow for the rapid deployment of units worldwide. In addition to rapid deployability, new weapons systems give the Dutch armed forces the ability to participate effectively in any type of operation throughout the operational continuum, be it operations during war, armed conflict or peace.

Will the new security policies and defense restructuring be adequate to meet the challenges of a new and uncertain security environment? My response is a qualified yes. Political desires by the Dutch government to continue to cash in on the "peace-dividend" and defense budget restraints will be one of the decisive factors in determining the true success of the new security policy. It is easy for political decision makers to question the funding of potentially expensive weapons procurement programs, particularly when clearly defined threats to the national security interests of the Netherlands are often vague. The weapons programs outlined in this thesis reflect an acceptable compromise between the needs of the armed forces to successfully perform crisis management operations and the desires of the government to cut public spending on defense. In my opinion, a comprehensive and thorough plan has been developed and is in place. It is the responsibility of the military leadership to preserve that plan from further cuts and reductions. If the tenets of the new Dutch security policy are to be successful, the forces must be equipped to accomplish their new missions. The decision has been made to play a more proactive role in preserving peace and security. To send Dutch soldiers to perform dangerous missions without adequate training or equipment would be detrimental to mission success.

Current defense restructuring can meet the needs of the armed forces to operate and succeed world wide. Improvements in strategic and tactical sea and airlift, communications and intelligence as well as in combat force multipliers represent a considerable investment for the Netherlands. Without these improved capabilities, the Netherlands would remain dependant on other NATO countries to provide the necessary support, a position few countries would consider desirable. Practice has shown that operations not under NATO auspices require individual nations to rely more exclusively on their own military assets or cooperate with other non-NATO countries, particularly for airlift purposes.

The process of restructuring will take time. Accordingly, a new mentality and a closer relationship with the society must be forged. The Netherlands will find itself deploying its forces into dangerous, war-torn environments, without clear cut proposals to resolving those conflicts. The increased need, and emphasis on conducting crisis management operations will place greater demands on its service personnel and the general public. As involvement increases, so will the risks to Dutch soldiers correspondingly increase. The consequence of serving under the UN have already become painfully clear, as evidenced by actions in the former Yugoslavia. Commitment entails opportunity costs, including the lives of Dutch service personnel. The uncertain factor remains the public reaction to the secondary effects of this new Dutch security policy and defense restructuring. Public support and opinion play a critical role in the success of these developments. If the public determines that the cost is too high financially and in terms of lives, that the national interests of the Netherlands are not in jeopardy, and that the country can achieve its security and foreign policy goals without a more committed role, then the

policy will be a hard sell. Again the onus is on the military leadership to aggressively promote the professionalism and utility of the new policy and the forces that execute it. Actions speak louder than words, and professional, competent execution of assigned missions with minimal casualties will be the persuading factor. The military must concentrate on reshaping the attitudes and perceptions of the Dutch people regarding their armed forces. The potential exists to change decades-old perceptions of the Dutch armed forces, from that of mediocrity to that of a well trained, competent, professional force providing valuable service in helping to maintaining world stability.

I believe that the Netherlands will play a more active role in the security of Europe and will actively participate in crisis management operations, namely in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations, throughout the world. I expect that should a coalition of nations be assembled to conduct a peace enforcement operation or any other type of ground combat operation, the Netherlands will play an active role. The Netherlands now possesses the necessary weapons systems and force structures to provide ground forces to support such operations. However, I do believe that the Netherlands would prefer to act in the role of peacekeeper rather than peacemaker, given the choice. The Netherlands would opt to allow the United States to conduct the "peace enforcing" aspect of the operation and once the shooting has stopped, step in and conduct the support and stability operation. I believe this arrangement would be suitable for both parties. The United States military is geared towards combat operations. Once stability is restored, and the immediate threat defeated, American leadership would prefer nothing more than to see the rapid redeployment of its troops and allow the stability and support operations to be the

responsibility of the allies. Conversely, the Netherlands would like nothing better than to leave the shooting to the Americans and let the Dutch assist in restoring stability. Should the need arise for Dutch involvement in combat operations, they will contribute meaningfully and be able to accomplish the mission successfully.

In sum, I assert that the emergence of a new Dutch security policy and defense restructuring is a positive development in terms of the NATO alliance and in terms of the overall security situation in Europe. I foresee an increased operational tempo for the Dutch armed forces and I envision the Netherlands playing an active role in preserving peace and bringing humanitarian relief to many parts of the world. Should a major conflict erupt, the Dutch will be among the nations involved.

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
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APPENDIX A

The Kingdom of the Netherlands
Map of the Netherlands and Territories:



(part of the Dutch realm)

(A-1)

Country Data

Netherlands

Geography

Location: Western Europe, bordering the North Sea, between Belgium and Germany

Map references: Europe

Area:

total area: 37,330 sq km

land area: 33,920 sq km

comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of New Jersey

Land boundaries: total 1,027 km, Belgium 450 km, Germany 577 km

Coastline: 451 km

Maritime claims:

exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm

territorial sea: 12 nm

International disputes: none

Climate: temperate; marine; cool summers and mild winters

Terrain: mostly coastal lowland and reclaimed land (polders); some hills in southeast

Natural resources: natural gas, petroleum, fertile soil

Netherlands Antilles

(part of the Dutch realm)

Geography

Location: Caribbean, two island groups in the Caribbean Sea - one includes Curacao and Bonaire north of Venezuela and the other is east of the Virgin Islands

Map references: Central America and the Caribbean

Area:

total area: 960 sq km

land area: 960 sq km

comparative area: slightly less than 5.5 times the size of Washington, DC

note: includes Bonaire, Curacao, Saba, Sint Eustatius, and Sint Maarten (Dutch part of the island of Saint Martin)

Land boundaries: 0 km

Coastline: 364 km

Maritime claims:

exclusive fishing zone: 12 nm

territorial sea: 12 nm


International disputes: none

Climate: tropical; ameliorated by northeast trade winds

APPENDIX B

Strategic Analysis Model


Schematic Diagram of the Strategic Analysis Model



Strategic Development Model

Schematic Diagram of Strategy Development

Expected development Could lead to We will accept (not)... We prefer... Thus we must



APPENDIX C

1996-1997 Defense Budget

	Defence Priorities Review required strength for 1996 according to the Defence Priorities Review ¹⁾	reduction from estimated strength 1990 ²⁾	Budget for 1996 Figures according to 1996-budget	reduction from estimated strength 1990 ²⁾
Royal Netherlands Navy				
Regular personnel	13910	10.9%	13986	10.4%
Conscript personnel	85	94.6%	85	94.6%
Total military personnel	13995	18.5%	14071	18.0%
Civilian personnel	4934	16.9%	4994	15.9%
<i>Total personnel</i>	18929	18.1%	19065	17.5%
Royal Netherlands Army				
Regular personnel	25391	-0.7%	25945	-2.9%
Conscript personnel	5000	83.3%	5000	83.3%
Total military personnel	31391	48.7%	31945	47.8%
Civilian personnel	10982	12.8%	11042	12.4%
<i>Total personnel</i>	42373	42.6%	42988	41.8%
Royal Netherlands Airforce				
Regular Personnel	12166	15.9%	12719	12.1%
Conscript personnel	45	98.7%	45	98.7%
Total military personnel	12211	32.0%	12765	29.0%
Civilian personnel	1996	10.4%	2124	4.6%
<i>Total personnel</i>	14207	29.7%	14888	25.3%
Royal Marechaussee				
Regular personnel	4405	5.8%	4274	8.6%
Conscript personnel	205	49.5%	265	34.7%
Total military personnel	4610	9.3%	4539	10.7%
Civilian personnel	129	11.0%	130	10.3%
<i>Total personnel</i>	4739	9.4%	4669	10.7%
Central organisation ³⁾				
Regular personnel	419	4.8%	419	4.8%
Conscript personnel	10	60.0%	10	60.0%
Total military personnel	429	7.7%	429	7.7%
Civilian personnel	911	5.4%	936	2.8%
<i>Total personnel</i>	1340	6.2%	1365	4.4%
Defensie Support Services Group				
Regular personnel	62	18.4%	73	3.9%
Civilian personnel	607	11.0%	637	6.6%
<i>Total personnel</i>	669	11.7%	710	6.3%
Total Defence Organisation				
Regular personnel	56353	6.9%	57416	5.2%
Conscript personnel	6345	84.8%	6405	84.6%
Total military personnel	62698	38.6%	63821	37.5%
Civilian personnel	19559	15.3%	19863	14.0%
TOTAAL PERSONEEL	82257	34.3%	83684	33.2%
Duyverman Computer Centre				
Regular personnel			10	
Civilian personnel			540	
<i>Total personnel</i>			550	
Defence Infrastructure Agency				
Regular personnel			61	
Civilian personnel			1254	
<i>Total personnel</i>			1315	
TOTAL Defence Organisation ⁴⁾ (including Duyverman centre and infrastructure agency)	84021	33.8%	85549	32.7%


The personnel strength as contained in the Defence Priorities Review includes neither the personnel who benefit from the premature voluntary retirement scheme for military personnel (abbreviated to BV-LOM in Dutch), nor the (expected) number of personnel above the organic strength. By contrast, the levels indicated in the budget do include these two categories of personnel.

- 1) The manpower figures for 1996 as contained in the Defence Priorities Review have been updated for those changes in the personnel strength which should be disregarded for the purpose of calculating the size of the reductions.
- 2) The estimated strength in 1990 serves as the criterion for evaluating the personnel reductions (see Defence White Paper 1991, p. 164 of the integral version).
- 3) From 1996 the revised budget for 1995 is used as the criterion for the Central Organisation in view to the large numbers of personnel involved in the setting up of the Defence Support Services Group and the Defence Infrastructure Agency becoming more autonomous. The reductions in the Central Organisation (1995 budget in relation to 1990 budget) amounted to 14.8 percent; the 1996 budget would mean a reduction of the Central Organisation by 19.5 percent in relation to 1990.
- 4) In the total manpower levels the figures for the personnel complements of the Duyverman Computer Centre and the Defence Infrastructure Agency mentioned in the 1996 budget column have been added to the figure in the Defence Priorities Review column.

APPENDIX D

Organizational Charts

Situation of the Royal Netherlands Army 1998:



Force Strengths

Restructuring NL-Army

Force strengths

	1992	1998
Normal regular personnel	16.000	10.800
Fixed-term contract personnel	5.700	14.700
Civilians	11.000	10.700
Conscripts	<u>31.000</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	53.700	36.200

slide 9

Major Restructuring Projects



Restructuring NL-Army

1 (NL) Army

- 93 Deactivate 42 Mechbrig
- 93 Reorg 11 Signalbat into
Signalbat MND
- 93-94 Reorg 11 Airmobile Brig
- 93-97 Reorg units for
crisismanagement operations
- 94 Deactivate 12 Mechbrig
- 94 Reorg 52 Armoured Infantry
Brigade to form 52 Mechbrig (M)

slide 10

Defense Reorganization



APPENDIX E **GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS**

BBT	Beroepsmilitairen Bepaalde Tijd (short-contract enlistees)
C-130	Medium transport aircraft
CJTF	Combined-Joint task Force
CSCE	Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DOD	Department of Defense
DUTCHBAT	Dutch Battalion
EU	European Union
FOOC	Foreign Officer Orientation Course
GNP	Gross National Product
IDL	Instituut Defensie Leergangen, Rijswijk NL
IFOR	Implementation Force
KLM	Koninklijke Lucht Maatschappij (Dutch Airline)
LOC	Line of Communication
LTG	Lieutenant General
MCCD	Mobile Counter-Concentration Defense
MFO	Multi-National Forces of observers
MILSAT	Military Satellite
MLU	Mid-Life Update
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOU	Memorandum of Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLG	Netherlands Guilders (Dutch currency)
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SFOR	Stability Force
SLAR	Side-looking Airborne Radar
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protective Force
US	United States
WEU	West European Union

VITA

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Education: B.S., Political Science, Columbus State University
Columbus, Georgia, 1986

M.A., West European Studies, Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana, 1997 (expected)

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Captain, 1st Special Forces Regiment (Airborne), United States Army

Former Commander of Operational Detachment Alpha 366, 2d Battalion, 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Military Education:

Netherlands Defense College, Staff Services Course, Rijswijk, 1995
Defense Language Institute, Monterey California, 1994
Special Forces Detachment Officers Qualification Course, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1991

Overseas Assignments:

The Netherlands, 1995

Awards and Decorations:

Meritorious Service Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal with Oak Leaf
Special Forces and Ranger Tabs
Senior Parachutist Badge
Expert Infantryman's Badge
Pathfinder and Air Assault Badges